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1 
BANNING STATE RECOGNITION OF SAME-
SEX RELATIONSHIPS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF NEBRASKA’S 
INITIATIVE 416 
Christopher Rizzo* 
INTRODUCTION 
Nebraska is not unique in having passed a ban on state 
recognition of some same-sex relationships—dozens of states 
have done so.1 What is unprecedented is the breadth of 
                                                          
 * The author is an attorney and Menapace Fellow at the Municipal Art 
Society in New York City; practice areas include environmental, land use and 
constitutional law as it relates to municipal governance. He is a graduate of 
Manhattan College, 1997, and of Pace University School of Law, 2001. The 
conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are exclusively those of the 
author and do not represent any official or unofficial position of the Municipal 
Art Society or any of its members. 
1 See Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, State Legislative 
Reactions to Suits for Same-Sex Marriage (April 2002) (listing Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington and 
West Virginia as states, in addition to Nebraska, that have passed anti-
marriage laws intended to block in and out of state marriage licenses of same-
sex couples), available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/t-line-2.html; ALA. 
CODE § 30-1-19 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 2002); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2002); 
FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-31 (2002); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 32-201 (Michie 2002); ILL. 
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Nebraska’s law and the wide margin, seventy percent, by which 
it was passed by voters in November 2000.2 The law, referred to 
as “Initiative 416,” is the most far-reaching ban on same-sex 
relationships in the United States, providing: 
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid 
or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of 
the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or 
other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or 
recognized in Nebraska.3 
This constitutional amendment, passed by popular initiative,4 
reflects nationwide concern that recognition of marriage by 
persons of the same sex will be mandated in states where no 
explicit ban exists.5 
                                                          
COMP. STAT. 5/201 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (2001); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 402.005 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89 
(West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 650, 701 (West 2002); MD. 
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 551.1, 
551.271-72 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 
451.022 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
14-03-01, 14-03-08 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (2002); 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 
2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
36-3-113 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2-104 (2002). 
2 See Leslie Reed, Three Turning Points Shaped Mills, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Nov. 27, 2000, at 11 (describing popular support for the initiative 
and the extensive campaign launched by Guyla Mills, a born-again Christian, 
to gain support for the legislation). For an examination of the breadth of the 
initiative, see infra Part II (setting forth the scope of the law and range of 
relationships and legal arrangements affected). 
3 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29. 
4 Laws passed by popular initiative are typically proposed, campaigned 
for and voted upon by citizens rather than lawmakers. Initiative is defined as 
“[a]n electoral process by which a percentage of voters can propose legislation 
and compel a vote on it by the legislature or by the full electorate.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 788 (7th ed. 1999). 
5 The most tangible example of this concern is the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), passed by Congress in 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (2002). DOMA grants states permission to deny recognition to same-
sex marriages created in other states and provides, in relevant part, “[n]o 
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
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The concern stems from decisions by state courts in Alaska, 
Hawaii and Vermont holding that denying gays the right to 
marry, and the rights associated with marriage, is unlawful.6 
Other states, like Nebraska, feared that these decisions would 
                                                          
required to give effect to any public act . . . respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage . . . .” See also 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7 (defining marriage as a legal union between a man and a woman). For 
further discussion of DOMA’s effects upon state law and recognition of same-
sex relationships, see supra Part I.B (exploring the provisions of DOMA as a 
response to potential state court recognition of same-sex marriage rights and 
setting forth provisions of the statute). See also Evelyn Nieves, Ballot 
Initiative That Would Thwart Gay Marriage is Embroiling California, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at A12 (discussing the controversial nature of 
California’s Knight Initiative, which asks California voters to define marriage 
in such a way that same-sex marriages from other states would not be 
recognized). 
6 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), aff’d, 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001) (holding that Alaska’s 
statutory ban on same-sex marriages denied plaintiffs their fundamental right 
to choose life partners and implicated privacy and equal protection issues 
under the Alaska Constitution); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) 
(requiring the state to show that its statute banning same-sex marriage met 
strict scrutiny review to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding that the Common Benefits 
Clause of the Vermont Constitution entitles same-sex couples to obtain the 
same benefits and protections afforded opposite-sex couples under state law). 
 State legislatures in Hawaii and Vermont responded by offering varying 
levels of marriage-like rights to gays. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
431:10-234 (addressing reciprocal beneficiaries’ rights in life insurance 
policies) (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-212 (2000) (regarding the 
right of election to surviving reciprocal beneficiaries); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 572c (1999) (providing for “reciprocal beneficiary relationships”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2002) (allowing same-sex couples to 
establish “civil union” relationships, which enables them to receive the 
benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of married 
spouses); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (describing the benefits, 
protections and responsibilities of parties to a civil union, which include the 
responsibility for support, application of laws relating to annulment, 
separation, divorce, child custody, property division and maintenance, group 
insurance for state employees, medical care, family leave benefits, workers’ 
compensation benefits, public assistance benefits and marital evidentiary 
privilege among others). 
RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC 4/1/03 2:52 PM 
4 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
foster gay marriage in their states and responded with bans.7 The 
underlying source of these concerns is the requirement under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution 
that the states recognize legal decisions of other states.8 Thus, 
numerous states have passed laws prohibiting recognition of a 
same-sex marriage, even if valid when performed in another 
state.9 The ban enacted in Nebraska, however, goes beyond 
marriage and discusses other relationships like “domestic 
partnerships,” “civil unions” and “other” relationships.10 States 
are permitted to regulate marriage, but the scope and content of 
Initiative 416 raises questions about whether the amendment is a 
                                                          
7 The federal government responded as well with DOMA. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-664 (1996) (stating that the report is “a response to a very particular 
development in the State of Hawaii. . . . The prospect of permitting 
homosexual couples to ‘marry’ in Hawaii threatens to have very real 
consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage 
laws) of the various States.”). Id.; see also YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR 
SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 229 (2002) (noting that in response to the 
Hawaii decision, thirty-five states passed laws in the five year period between 
1996 and 2001 that “restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples by specifically 
defining marriage as a union between persons of the opposite sex, specifically 
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex in the state, and 
avoiding recognition of same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other 
states”). For further discussion of DOMA, see infra Part I.B. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause reads, 
“[f]ull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Id. See also MERIN, 
supra note 7, at 231. Merin notes: 
If same sex marriage is legalized in one or more states, the question 
will arise whether marriages performed there are to be recognized in 
other jurisdictions. It is debatable whether the U.S. Constitution will 
compel such recognition, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
has not commonly been relied upon by courts in determining whether 
they should recognize out-of-state marriages (e.g., common law 
marriages) that could not have been performed within the jurisdiction. 
Id. 
9 See supra note 1 (listing states that have passed DOMAs). 
10 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29. 
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valid exercise of the state’s power to determine who can and 
cannot be married.11 
Litigation over the amendment’s constitutionality is almost 
certain.12 The real conflict, however, is taking place among 
American citizens as changing values and attitudes towards 
homosexuality are reflected in courts and legislatures across the 
country.13 As the Supreme Court of Hawaii aptly noted, “with all 
                                                          
11 Marriage is inarguably a domestic matter, and it is well established that 
“there is no federal law of domestic relations.” De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 
U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (holding that the court must look to state law in 
determining whether an illegitimate child is included within the term 
“children” as used in the federal Copyright Act); see also Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction in 
federal courts for domestic relations cases); Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 
593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and 
wife, parent and child, belongs to the law of the states, and not to the laws of 
the United States.”); Salisbury v. Lust, 501 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D. Nev. 1980) 
(“The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function retained by the 
states; it has not been granted to the federal government.”); O’Neill v. Dent, 
364 F. Supp. 565, 569 n.6 (E.D.N.Y 1973) (“[S]ubject to constitutional 
limitations, the legislatures of the States are authorized to regulate the 
qualifications of the contracting parties, the forms or procedures necessary to 
solemnize the marriage, the various duties and obligations which it creates, 
and the procedures for dissolution”). 
12 See American Civil Liberties Union, Statewide Anti-Gay Marriage 
Laws (Jan. 31, 1998), at http://www. aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGay 
Rights.cfm?ID=9211&c=. The ACLU maintains that anti-gay marriage laws 
violate various constitutional provisions, including full faith and credit and 
equal protection, as well as the right to interstate travel as established by the 
Supreme Court. Id. 
13 In fact, the number of states with nondiscrimination laws banning 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation increases nearly every year. 
For an updated, annual compilation and analysis of such legislation, see 
National Gay Lesbian and Lesbian Task Force, State Legislative Tracking and 
Reporting (providing year-round legislative tracking and reporting as well as 
an annual analysis report for all state legislative activity pertaining to lesbian, 
gay, bi-sexual and trans-gendered issues), at http://www.ngltf.org/statelocal/ 
tracking.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). 
 For example, New Jersey’s non-discrimination statute protects gays from 
discrimination in employment and public accommodations: 
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to 
obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges 
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due respect to the Virginia Courts of a bygone era, we do not 
believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on Divine 
Will, and . . . constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that 
customs change with an evolving social order.”14 The court was 
referring to the opinion by the Virginia courts upholding the ban 
on mixed-race marriages, an opinion that was overturned by the 
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Commonwealth of 
Virginia.15 Similarly, state courts in Alaska, Hawaii and Vermont 
mandated equal rights for gays, even though the legislatures had 
not previously done so.16 
                                                          
of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination 
because of . . . sexual orientation . . . . This opportunity is 
recognized as and declared to be a civil right. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2001). 
 Additionally, contentious public hearings held in Nebraska while Initiative 
416 was under consideration demonstrate the deep divisions that exist over this 
issue. For a full account of these debates and the issues raised therein, see 
generally Initiative Measures 415 and 416: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Education, 96th Leg., 2d Sess. (2000) [hereinafter Hearing Before the 
Committee on Education]; Initiative Measures 415 and 416; Hearing 
Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, 96th Leg., 2d Sess. (Oct. 11, 12, 
2000) [hereinafter Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State]. 
14 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (stating that 
although the Virginia courts in the 1800s may have “declared that interracial 
marriage simply could not exist because the Deity had deemed such a union 
intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had theretofore never been the 
‘custom’ of the state to recognize mixed marriages,” current courts must apply 
constitutional law recognizing changing customs and social standards) (quoting 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967))). This article references Baehr v. 
Lewin in short citation form as Baehr I to distinguish it from Baehr v. Miike, 
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), on remand from 910 P.2d 
112 (Haw. 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), which involved the same 
group of plaintiffs. 
15 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966), rev’d 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
16 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (finding that the “recognition of one’s choice of a 
life partner is a fundamental right and therefore the state must have a 
compelling interest to refuse the exercise of that right by same-sex partners”); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (reversing the trial court’s judgment 
and retaining jurisdiction pending legislative action because the State was 
constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits 
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This article does not focus on the fundamental right to marry 
or the first sentence of the Nebraska law concerning same-sex 
marriage.17 Rather, the article explores the second sentence of 
Initiative 416, which goes beyond a mere ban on marriage and 
states that Nebraska shall not recognize “a civil union, domestic 
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship.”18 Part I 
provides the history of state recognition of same-sex relationships 
and the controversy it has caused in many states.19 Part II 
                                                          
and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law); Baehr I, 852 
P.2d at 68 (remanding the case for a hearing to determine whether Hawaii’s 
marriage license law furthered compelling state interests and was narrowly 
drawn to avoid unnecessarily violating plaintiffs’ equal protection rights). 
17 This does not reflect the author’s conclusions about the constitutionality 
of the ban on gay marriage. This ban has several constitutional implications, 
including violation of the fundamental right to marry, due process, gender 
discrimination, equal protection and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Hawaii’s court first considered the ban on gay marriage as a 
denial of the fundamental right to marry and gender discrimination. See 
generally Baehr I, 852 P.2d 44. Alaska considered claims of gender 
discrimination as well as denial of the right to choose a life partner. See 
Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *5-6. Finally, Vermont’s Supreme Court directly 
addressed the issue of sexual orientation discrimination. See Baker, 744 A.2d 
at 886-87. 
 A thorough examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article. 
For thoughtful discussions and analysis of these and other similarly compelling 
matters, see Nan D. Hunter, Millennium Speech the Sex Discrimination 
Argument In Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397 (2001) (arguing that laws 
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in fact discriminate on the 
basis of sex and examining the impacts of feminist jurisprudence, as well as 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights); Arthur S. Leonard, Ten 
Propositions About Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partners, 30 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 343 (2002) (discussing the various ramifications of legal recognition of 
same-sex partners on equality for homosexuals, as well as achieving access to 
marriage and strategies to do so); John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, 
Can Homosexual Equal Protection Claims Withstand the Implications of 
Bowers v. Hardwick?, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.703 (2001) (discussing the 
difficulty for a homosexual to bring a federal equal protection claim as long as 
Bowers v. Hardwick remains good law). 
18 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29. 
19 It should be noted that some suggest that same-sex unions may not 
necessarily reflect the participants’ sexual orientation, but rather the desire to 
take advantage of tenant or inheritance laws. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. 
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considers the scope of the Nebraska amendment with its broad 
language, and the potential impact it may have beyond the 
context of gay marriage. Once the scope of the law is established, 
Part III considers equal protection concerns raised by the second 
sentence of Initiative 416, which bars recognition of non-
marriage unions between same-sex partners but not opposite-sex 
partners. Given that state courts are generally required to 
recognize judicial decisions and contracts from other states, 
Section IV examines the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution and issues that the law will raise in 
this context.20 Section V considers whether Initiative 416 will 
impair contracts between same-sex partners, implicating the 
Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.21 Finally, 
Section VI concludes that the Initiative 416 does violate the 
Constitution in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. 
Evans.22 
                                                          
ANN. § 572C-2 (2000) (establishing that persons with significant emotional, 
personal and economic relationships who are legally prohibited from 
marrying, for example brothers and sisters, uncles and nieces, or individuals 
of the same sex, can receive the same rights and benefits as married couples as 
reciprocal beneficiaries); Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New 
Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 42 n.152 (2000) (discussing how 
any two people can register as reciprocal beneficiaries under Hawaii Law and 
obtain benefits similar to those received by registered lesbian or gay couples). 
This article uses the terms “gay relationship” and “same-sex relationship” 
interchangeably. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 160 
(1901) (explaining that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit clause is to 
“give the same conclusive effect to the judgments of all the States, so as to 
promote certainty and uniformity in the rule among them”); supra note 8 
(quoting the Full Faith and Credit Clause). For further explanation, see infra 
Part IV. 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contracts Clause reads, “No State 
shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . .” Id.; 
see also GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 506 (13th ed. 1997) (explaining the main purpose of the “contracts 
clause was to restrain state laws affecting private contracts,” especially as they 
related to debtor relief laws). For further explanation, see infra Part V. 
22 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, homosexuals and municipalities 
challenged the validity and enforcement of Amendment 2 to the Colorado 
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I. THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTROVERSY 
For many years marriage was universally considered a 
relationship between a man and a woman.23 Same-sex couples 
that challenged state laws that denied them the right to marry 
invariably lost.24 For example in 1974 in Singer v. Hara, the 
Supreme Court of Washington found that the state’s law clearly 
defined marriage as between a man and a woman.25 The court 
first noted that states are given the exclusive power to regulate 
marriage and determine which persons are eligible to be 
married.26 Accordingly, in Singer, the legal challenge to 
Washington’s law ended with the judicial determination that the 
state had exercised this authority and defined marriage as 
                                                          
Constitution which precludes all legislative, executive or judicial action at the 
state or local level designed to protect the status of persons based on their 
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.” Id. at 624. The Court held that Amendment 2 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and “classified homosexuals . . . [so] to make them 
unequal to everyone else” and strangers to the laws of Colorado. Id. at 635. 
23 See Laurence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in 
Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (2002) (stating that marriage revolves 
around sexual intercourse and has always been the legal union of a man and 
woman); Lynne Marie Kohm & Mark A. Yarhouse, Fairness, Accuracy and 
Honesty in Discussing Homosexuality and Marriage, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 
249 (2001) (stating that marriage has always been a fundamental constitutional 
right but that there are “minimum requirements to marry [,which] include: the 
parties being of minimum age, one at a time, unrelated by blood or marriage, 
and of different sexes”). 
24 See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding 
that the Washington marriage statute prohibits same-sex marriages and does 
not violate the equal rights amendment to the Washington State Constitution); 
see also Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (holding that there is 
no constitutional protection of the right of marriage between persons of the 
same sex, and that two women cannot enter into a marriage). 
25 Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189. Specifically, the court noted that, despite a 
1970 amendment that replaced “male” and “female” with “persons,” the 
legislature still intended not to authorize same-sex marriage, as was evident in 
the use of “male” and “female” on the affidavit for issuance of a marriage 
license. Id. 
26 Id. at 1197. 
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between a man and a woman.27 Specifically, the court noted that 
the law made reference to “‘the male’ and ‘the female’ which 
clearly dispel[led] any suggestion that the legislature intended to 
authorize same-sex marriages.”28 
A. State Responses 
The first changes came when state courts in Hawaii and 
Alaska interpreted their state constitutions to guarantee gays the 
right to marry.29 In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii found that denying gays the right to marry was gender 
discrimination.30 The court applied “strict scrutiny” to what it 
called a sex-based classification.31 The state was ordered to 
demonstrate that the law “further[ed] compelling state interests 
and [was] narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of 
constitutional rights.”32 Later, when the state’s response to the 
court order was considered in Baehr v. Miike, the court found 
that the state had failed to show a compelling reason for denying 
gays this right.33 Faced with the prospect that the state’s court 
                                                          
27 Id. (“[W]e are unable to say that there is not a rational basis upon 
which the state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal union 
of one man and one woman.”). 
28 Id. at 1189. The court also rejected a challenge based upon gender 
discrimination, as plaintiffs claimed that the Washington marriage statutes 
violated their equal rights under the Washington State Constitution because 
allowing a man to marry a woman but not another man is a classification made 
based upon sex. Id. at 1191-92. The court pointed out, however, that same-sex 
marriage licenses are denied equally to both male and female pairs, and 
therefore the marriage statutes do not violate equal rights. Id. 
29 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii’s 
Constitution restricting marriage to male and female is sex-based 
discrimination); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that the marriage code in Alaska’s 
Constitution is also sex-based discrimination).  
30  Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 44. 
31 Id. at 67. 
32 Id. at 68. 
33 See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), 
on remand from 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 
1997). The court declared that sex based discrimination invoked strict 
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would require gay marriage in the state, Hawaiians amended 
their constitution to read that “the legislature shall have the 
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”34 Unlike 
Nebraska’s Initiative 416, however, Hawaii’s amendment does 
not address non-marital same-sex relationships like “domestic 
partnerships.”35 Hawaii’s law is also limited to public recognition 
of marriage rights, stating that private solemnization is not 
unlawful.36 
To remedy some of the inequities acknowledged by the court, 
                                                          
scrutiny, and thus the state bore the burden of showing that it had a 
compelling interest and narrowly tailored means for achieving that interest. Id. 
at *19. The state failed to overcome its presumption that the restriction was 
unconstitutional because it failed to present sufficient evidence that the optimal 
development of children is adversely affected when same-sex couples raise 
children. Id. at *21. Further, the state failed to show that allowing same-sex 
marriage would negatively affect public policy, assure that Hawaii marriages 
are recognized in other states, or any other important state interest. Id. at *22. 
34 HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii 
Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 
19, 26-27 (2000) (noting that the “Marriage Amendment” was a direct 
response by opponents of the Baehr I decision seeking to prevent the inevitable 
ability of same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses in the state). 
35 The significance of this legislative approach is illustrated by comparing 
the text of Hawaii’s amendment to Nebraska’s. Hawaii’s legislature focused 
only on marriage and used terminology making the act of marriage one that is 
“reserved” for opposite sex couples, and there is no mention of same-sex 
couples. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Hawaii’s Constitution states simply, 
“[t]he legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead of reserving the right for some, the 
Nebraska legislature framed the issue as a restriction against the behavior of 
same-sex couples. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. It states, “[o]nly marriage 
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The 
uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, 
or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in 
Nebraska.” Id. (emphasis added).  
36 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (2002). The statute states, “Nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed to render unlawful, or otherwise 
affirmatively punishable at law, the solemnization of same-sex relationships by 
religious organizations; provided that nothing in this section shall be construed 
to confer any of the benefits, burdens or obligations of marriage under the 
laws of Hawaii.” Id. 
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Hawaii’s legislature quickly moved to provide same-sex couples 
with some rights traditionally reserved to married couples.37 For 
example, same-sex partners in Hawaii can now register to 
become “reciprocal beneficiaries.”38 Parties to these agreements 
need not be gay, simply of the same-sex and willing to prepare a 
notarized declaration of their relationship.39 Some of the rights 
extended include the right of election for surviving spouses and 
reciprocal beneficiaries,40 the right to life insurance for a 
partner41 and hospital visitation rights.42 
                                                          
37 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993) (noting that 
on its face the statute “denies same-sex couples access to the marital status and 
its concomitant rights and benefits. It is the State’s regulation of access to the 
status of married persons, on the basis of the applicants’ sex, that gives rise to 
the question whether the applicant couples have been denied the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
38 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (2002). The statute states that “[t]wo 
persons . . . may enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship and register 
their relationship as reciprocal beneficiaries by filing a signed notarized 
declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship with the director.” Id. 
39 See id. 
40 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-212 (2002).  
The right of election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse or 
reciprocal beneficiary who is living when the petition for the elective 
share is filed in the court under section 560:2-211(a). If the election is 
not exercised by the surviving spouse or reciprocal beneficiary 
personally, it may be exercised on the surviving spouse’s or 
reciprocal beneficiary’s behalf by the spouse’s or reciprocal 
beneficiary’s conservator, guardian, or agent under the authority of a 
power of attorney. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
41 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-234 (2002).  
Every life insurance policy made payable to or for the benefit of the 
spouse or the reciprocal beneficiary of the insured, and every life 
insurance policy assigned, transferred, or in any way made payable to 
a spouse or reciprocal beneficiary, or to a trustee for the benefit of a 
spouse or a reciprocal beneficiary, regardless of how the assignment 
or transfer is procured, shall, unless contrary to the terms of the 
policy, inure to the separate use and benefit of such spouse or 
reciprocal beneficiary. 
Id. 
42 HAW. REV. STAT. § 323-2 (2002). The statute states that a “reciprocal 
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State courts in Alaska also addressed this issue and found 
denying gays and lesbians the right to marry unconstitutional 
under state law.43 The court first considered the right to privacy 
and the right to “choice of life partner.”44 Although marriage to a 
partner of the same-sex is not a fundamental right in Alaska, 
because no such right is rooted in tradition, the court found that 
the right to choose a life partner is.45 Denial of this right merited 
                                                          
beneficiary, as defined in chapter 572C, of a patient shall have the same rights 
as a spouse with respect to visitation and making health care decisions for the 
patient.” Id. 
43 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). Plaintiffs, two men, sought and were denied a 
marriage license by the State of Alaska. Id. at *1. Thereafter, they filed a 
complaint seeking a declaration that the prohibition of same-gender marriage 
violated the Alaska Constitution. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a ruling 
on the level of scrutiny to be applied in review of the Marriage Code. Id. In 
finding that the choice of a life partner implicates constitutional provisions, 
namely the right to privacy and equal protection, the parties were ordered to 
determine whether a compelling state interest could be shown for the ban on 
same-sex marriage. Id. at *6. In 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court heard from 
the same plaintiffs on the matter of whether a same-sex couple precluded from 
marrying may be denied benefits that are legally available only to married 
people. See Brause v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 21 
P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001). The court affirmed dismissal of the claim on the 
grounds that no actual controversy was ripe for adjudication. Id. The standard 
for determining ripeness, as articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court, 
depended on “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship 
to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 359 (quoting Lake 
Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972)). According to the 
court, the plaintiffs did not allege that they ever had or would be deprived 
rights available exclusively to married persons and “to the extent that the need 
to decide is a function of the probability that they will suffer an anticipated 
injury, [plaintiffs] failed to demonstrate such a need.” Id. at 360. 
44 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1. The plaintiffs claimed that the right of 
privacy encompassed the right to choose one’s life partner as an important and 
personal choice, necessitating a compelling interest by the State to justify 
interference. Id. 
45 Id. at *4. The court recognized that marriage between a man and 
woman is a deeply rooted tradition and, therefore, a fundamental right. Id. 
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965)). Yet the question invoked here—“whether the personal 
decision [to] choose a mate of the same gender will be recognized as the same 
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strict scrutiny, and the court ordered the state to demonstrate a 
compelling interest.46 In fact, it criticized the Hawaiian court’s 
historical approach to determining if gay marriage was a 
fundamental right, stating: “It is self-evident that same-sex 
marriage is not ‘accepted’ or ‘rooted in the traditions and 
collective conscience’ of the people. Were this not the case [the 
plaintiffs] would not have had to file complaints seeking precisely 
this right.”47 Rather, the relevant question was whether the 
choice of a “life partner” was rooted in tradition.48 The court 
found that it clearly was.49 
Like the court in Hawaii, Alaska’s court also found that the 
ban on same-sex relationships was gender discrimination, saying, 
“Sex-based classification can hardly be more obvious.”50 The 
Alaskan constitution contains a strongly worded anti-
discrimination clause that states, “Civil Rights: no person is to be 
denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of 
race, color, creed, sex or national origin.”51 As in Hawaii, strict 
                                                          
fundamental right”—is decided by answering whether the choice, as opposed 
to the existence of same-sex marriage, is within the realm of the fundamental 
right of privacy. Id. 
46 Id. at *6. 
47 Id. at *4. The court referred to Baehr v. Lewin, and concluded that 
“the Hawaii court could reach such a conclusion because of the question it 
chose to ask”—whether same-sex marriage is a deeply rooted tradition. Id.; 
see also Baehr I, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
48 Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *4. 
49 Id. The court found that freedom to choose a life partner is a 
fundamental right subject to denial only if the state had a compelling interest. 
Id. at *1. Government intrusion into the choice of a life partner “encroache[d] 
on the intimate personal decisions of the individual,” and the choice can 
include persons of the opposite or of the same sex. Id. at *5. The court noted 
that because the right to marry and raise a traditional family is constitutionally 
protected, the right to “choose one’s life partner and have a recognized non-
traditional family” should also be protected. Id. at *6. 
50 Id. See also Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 562-79 (finding that the Hawaii 
statute limiting marriage certificates to male-female couples was a clear 
showing of discrimination based on sex, implicating the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Hawaii Constitution). 
51 ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 3. 
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scrutiny was applied.52 Ultimately, however, the litigation ended 
by a constitutional amendment defining marriage to exist “only 
between one man and one woman.”53 
Advocates of same-sex marriage had their most significant 
legal victory in Vermont.54 Vermont’s constitution contains a 
unique “Common Benefits Clause,” stating “that government is, 
or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and 
security of the people, nation or community and not for the 
                                                          
52 See Baehr I, 852 P.2d at 571 (stating that whenever denial of equal 
protection of laws is alleged, a strict scrutiny standard should be applied to 
determine whether there is a compelling state interest and whether the statute 
in question is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessarily violating a plaintiff’s 
equal protection under the law); see also Brause, 1998 WL 88743 at *6 
(holding that the strict scrutiny test is applicable to review a statute when it 
denies the fundamental right to choose one’s life partner). 
53 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this 
State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.”). This 
section took effect on January 3, 1999, and the amendment is the result of a 
referendum voted on by the Alaska electorate in November 1998, shortly after 
Brause was decided. Id. See also Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by 
Way of Cincinnati: On Romer, Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality 
of Referenda, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (1999). The referendum 
reportedly passed by a 2 to 1 majority. Id. at 1247 n.373. The amendment 
forms a strong barrier to same-sex marriages being allowed in Alaska because 
now the power to allow such unions no longer exists in the legislator but 
instead the ban is embedded in the State’s constitution. Id. at 1247-49. The 
Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged the amendment by declaring the relevant 
counts of an appeal of a same-sex couple’s denial of a marriage licenses to be 
“moot” in light of the amendment. See Brause v. State Dep’t of Health & Soc. 
Servs., 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001). 
54 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Same-sex couples 
brought an action against the State of Vermont seeking a declaratory judgment 
that a refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated the state’s marriage 
statutes and Constitution. Id. The court held that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the benefits and protections granted under the state marriage law 
violated the common benefits clause of the State Constitution. Id. The 
significance of this legal battle was noted by the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force—Policy Institute director Paula Ettelbrick stated in a press release 
that “the decision is a significant step forward for our community.” See 
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Vermont Begins to Pave the Way for 
Fairness for Same-Sex Couples (Dec. 20, 1999), at http://www.ngltf.org/ 
news/release.cfm?releaseID=254. 
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particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family 
or set of persons, who are of party only of the community.”55 In 
Baker v. Vermont, the Supreme Court of Vermont directly 
addressed the issue of sexual orientation based discrimination 
under this Common Benefits Clause, rather than considering the 
issue of gender discrimination.56 The decision held that barring 
gay marriage, or at least the rights associated with marriage, was 
unconstitutional.57 Following this decision, and unlike in Hawaii 
and Alaska, Vermont’s legislators did not undertake complicated 
                                                          
55 See VT. CONST. art. 7, chap. I; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. The 
plaintiffs argued that: 
[I]n denying them access to a civil marriage license, the law 
effectively excludes them from a broad array of legal benefits and 
protections incident to the marital relation, including access to a 
spouse’s medical, life, and disability insurance, hospital visitation and 
other medical decision making privileges, spousal support, intestate 
succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory 
protections. 
Id. at 870. In addition, the plaintiffs contested the trial court’s holding that the 
statute “served the State’s interest in promoting the ‘link between procreation 
and child rearing.’” Id. In support of this argument the plaintiffs asserted that 
a large number of married couples chose to remain childless, while a growing 
number of same-sex couples had children. Id. In essence, they demonstrated 
the paradox in “recognize[ing] the rights of same-sex partners as parents, yet 
deny[ing] them—and their children—the [rights of] spouses.” Id. 
56 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 880. The court held that the statute did not 
discriminate on the basis of gender because “the marriage laws are facially 
neutral; they do not single out men or women as a class for disparate 
treatment, but rather prohibit men and women equally from marrying a person 
of the same sex.” Id. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) 
(reversing a trial court decision barring same-sex marriages and remanding for 
further proceedings to determine whether the statute discriminated on the basis 
of gender). 
57 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 884. 
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are 
of such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be 
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and 
authority . . . . Considered in light of the extreme logical disjunction 
between the classification and the stated purposes of the law . . . the 
exclusion falls substantially short of this standard. 
Id. 
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constitutional amendments to bar legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships and marriages.58 Rather, Vermont opted to provide 
gays with an alternative to marriage: “civil unions.”59 The civil 
                                                          
58 For a discussion of the constitutional amendments that followed judicial 
decisions in Hawaii and Alaska, see supra notes 36-42, 53 and accompanying 
text. 
59 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (1999). Specifically, the statute 
provides that for a valid civil union to be established, the parties must “(1) 
[n]ot be party to another civil union or a marriage; (2) [b]e of the same sex 
and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state; [and] (3) [m]eet 
the criteria and obligations set forth in 18 V.S.A. chapter 106.” Id. A full 
discussion of Vermont’s civil union statute is beyond the scope of this article, 
although it has been the subject of substantial writing, research and analysis, 
both in the popular media and in academic journals. For further analysis, see 
Tonja Jacobi, Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont: Implications of Legislative 
Remand for the Judiciary’s Role, 26 VT. L. REV. 381 (2002) (examining the 
judiciary’s role in deferring to the legislature in determining social policy); Jill 
Jourdan, The Effects of Civil Unions on Vermont Children, VT. B.J., March 
28, 2002, at 32 (discussing the benefits that children of same-sex couples 
receive as a result of Vermont’s civil union legislation); Mary LaFrance, 
Defining Marriage: What Ballot Question 2 Doesn’t Do, NEV. LAW., Oct. 10, 
2002, at 15 (describing how the Vermont Assembly addressed the issue of 
religious freedom in adopting the Vermont civil union law); Arthur S. 
Leonard, Chronicling a Movement: 20 Years of Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, 17 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 415, 556 (2000) (stating that Vermont’s 
legislation, by avoiding labeling the civil union a marriage, “has deprived 
couples who are civilly united from being able to argue that other states are 
required to recognize their status under the settled principles of comity that 
states follow in recognizing out-of-state marriages”); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex 
Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise and Constitutional 
Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597, 608 (2002) (analyzing the array of 
reactions to Vermont’s civil union statute and concluding that although 
Vermont’s approach currently strikes an appropriate balance, future 
amendments should remove the separate status and allow same-sex marriage). 
 Various advocacy groups and organizations also provide updated legal 
information regarding laws that affect same-sex couples and the legal options 
available under civil union legislation. See generally Lambda Legal Defense & 
Education Fund, at http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2003); 
American Civil Liberties Union, at http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/ 
LesbianGayRightsMain.cfm; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, at http:// 
www.ngltf.org; Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/ 
legal/lgln (providing monthly legal updates on court rulings, legislation, and 
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union is available only to couples that are “of the same sex and 
[are] therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state.”60 
The law essentially grants to gay couples all the rights and 
responsibilities associated with marriage. These include divorce 
laws, estate laws, joint tax status, adoption rights and insurance 
rights.61 
B. The Federal Response 
The federal government has also enacted legislation barring 
recognition of same-sex relationships.62 The federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) was passed in 1996, following the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii’s decision in Baehr I, and prior to the 
Vermont court’s decision in Baker v. Vermont.63 The law has two 
                                                          
other legal developments affecting gays and lesbians) (last visited Mar. 3, 
2003). 
60 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202 (2002). 
61 See id. at § 1204. Section 1204 provides a “nonexclusive list of legal 
benefits, protections and responsibilities of spouses, which shall apply in like 
manner to parties to a civil union.” Id. Some of the protections and 
responsibilities include domestic relation law, probate and adoption law and 
procedure, state employee insurance, and state and local tax laws. Id. For a 
full discussion of domestic partnership rules and arrangements as they pertain 
to conflict of law issues and recognition of such arrangement between and 
amongst the various states, see generally Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and 
Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflicts of Laws Questions and 
Concerns, 2001 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1235 (2001) (addressing potential conflicts of 
laws recognizing domestic partnerships with issues of personal jurisdiction and 
choice of law). 
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2002); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002). 
63 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 5 (1996). Congress, responding 
directly to developments in Hawaii, stated: 
It is, of course, no business of Congress how the Hawaiian Supreme 
Court interprets the Hawaiian Constitution, and the Committee 
expresses no opinion on the propriety of the ruling in Baehr. But the 
Committee does think it significant that the threat to traditional 
marriage laws in Hawaii and elsewhere has come about because two 
judges of one state Supreme Court have given credence to a legal 
theory being advanced by gay rights lawyers. 
Id. 
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operative provisions. The first provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or 
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public 
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, 
territory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship.64 
The second provision states: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of 
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies or of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.65 
Relying on Singer v. Hara,66 Congress passed DOMA not 
only to “defend traditional marriage” at the federal level, but to 
allow states to avoid the “orchestrated legal assault being waged 
against” state control of the definition of marriage.67 The result 
                                                          
 Other commentators have also noted that the federal DOMA statute was 
passed in response to the Hawaii court decision. See, e.g., Theodora Ooms, 
The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 163, 172 (2001) (explaining how conservative advocacy groups’ 
anxieties about same-sex marriages “increased in light of state court of Hawaii 
rulings,” which urged Congress to pass DOMA by a large majority); Brett P. 
Ryan, Love and Let Love: Same-Sex Marriage, Past, Present, and Future, and 
the Constitutionality of DOMA, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 185, 214 (2000) 
(utilizing the fact that DOMA was developed in response to the “possibility—
and fear—that same-sex marriage might soon become legal, at least in Hawaii” 
in an argument that DOMA is unconstitutional). 
64 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). 
65 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). 
66 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 32 (1996). Specifically, a prepared 
statement by Lynn D. Wardle noted, “the definition of ‘marriage’ is derived 
from a case from the State of Washington, Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 
1191-92 (Wash. App. 1974).” Id. 
67 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10 (1996). The “background and need 
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for same-sex couples is profound—1,049 federal statutes deal 
with married couples, conferring hundreds of rights and 
responsibilities upon them.68 The federal law, however, is not 
nearly as broad as Nebraska’s Initiative 416. In fact, not only 
does the text explicitly mention only marriage, the legislative 
committee that drafted the law stated that “the committee would 
emphasize the narrowness of this provision.”69 
                                                          
for legislation” section of the report states that “the Committee believes it is 
important to place that development in its larger context. In particular, it is 
critical to understand the nature of the orchestrated legal assault being waged 
against traditional heterosexual marriage by gay rights groups and their 
lawyers.” Id. 
68 See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Denying Access to 
Marriage Harms the Family (noting that “[a]t the federal level, civil marriage 
is a gateway to more than 1049 protections, benefits, and obligations”), 
available at http://www.lambalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record 
=873 (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). The statute count was performed by the 
Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund and presented by Robert 
Pileggi, at a lecture at Columbia Law School on February 24, 2000. 
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 21 (1996). Specifically, the Committee 
stated: 
This section provides that ‘(n)o State . . . shall be required to give 
effect’ to same-sex ‘marriage’ licenses issued by another State. The 
Committee would emphasize the narrowness of this provision. 
Section 2 merely provides that, in the event Hawaii (or some other 
State) permits same-sex couples to ‘marry, other States will not be 
obligated or required, by operation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the United States Constitution, to recognize that ‘marriage,’ 
or any right or claim arising from it. 
Id. 
 This is not to suggest that, if challenged, the federal DOMA would 
necessarily pass constitutional muster. In fact, a number of commentators have 
suggested that it would not. See, e.g., Leonard G. Brown III, Constitutionally 
Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans and the 
Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159, 165 (1996) 
(discussing the debate over the constitutionality of DOMA); James M. 
Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist 
Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335, 338 (1997) (concluding that 
DOMA is unconstitutional because it has crossed the line between secular and 
religious and betrays the Establishment Clause of the Constitution); Scott 
Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of 
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Passage of the federal DOMA was followed by thirty-five 
“mini DOMAs” at the state level.70 Like the federal law, these 
state statutes ban recognition of gay marriage performed within 
or without the state. For example, Idaho passed a ban on 
recognition of gay marriages performed in other states.71 The ban 
was particularly meaningful because Idaho’s constitution contains 
                                                          
Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1450 (1997) (finding that 
Congress exceeded its authority in interpreting the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal 
Defects in H.R. 3396 and S. 1740, the Proposed Federal Legislation on 
Marriage and the Constitution, Lambda Legal, Sept. 1, 1996 (finding that the 
proposed statutes are unconstitutional because the statutes attempt to 
circumvent the Full Faith and Credit Clause, abridge fundamental rights 
including the right to marry and the right to travel, and nationalize domestic 
law), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record? 
record=80#N_25_. 
70 See supra note 1 (listing states that have passed DOMAs); see also 
Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of 
Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful 
Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 407 (1998) (discussing the 
constitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act); Nancy J. 
Feather, Defense of Marriage Acts: An Analysis Under State Constitutional 
Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1017 (1997) (arguing that state enacted defense of 
marriage acts may often be unconstitutional because state constitutions tend to 
offer greater protection than the Federal Constitution in the area of individual 
rights including privacy, equal rights and equal protection); Mark Strasser, 
When is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions 
of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 305 (2001) (discussing state 
versions of the Defense of Marriage Act); Partners Task Force for Gay & 
Lesbian Couples, State Legislative Reactions to Suits for Same-Sex Marriage 
(April 2002) (noting which states have passed anti-marriage laws and detailing 
the years in which these laws were enacted), available at http://www.buddy 
buddy.com/toc.html. 
71 See IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 2000).  
All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid by 
the laws of the state or country in which the same were contracted, 
are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this 
state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but 
are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into 
under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the 
prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state. 
Id. 
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a common benefits clause similar to Vermont’s.72 
C. Nebraska Law and Same-Sex Partners 
Nebraska sought to pass its own ban on gay marriage as well. 
For example, the attorney general of Nebraska was asked by the 
legislature to recommend the best method of defending the state’s 
“traditional” marriage against the court decision in Hawaii.73 
This report suggested that the nation’s only unicameral legislature 
pass a ban on gay marriage to allow the federal DOMA to be 
effective in Nebraska.74 It stated that “[w]ithout affirmative 
legislation on the subject, Nebraska would most likely be 
subjected to litigation in an attempt to force recognition of same-
sex marriage licenses issued in Hawaii.”75 Hawaii never did 
recognize same-sex marriage, and Nebraska never passed such a 
                                                          
72 See IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 2. This clause, titled “Political power 
inherent in the people,” states: 
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted 
for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, 
reform or abolish the same whenever they may deem it necessary; 
and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may 
not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature. 
Id. For a discussion of Vermont’s Common Benefits Clause, see supra note 
55. 
73 See Same-sex Marriage - Impact of Baehr v. Lewin and the Defense of 
Marriage Act on Nebraska Law, Op. Neb. Att’y. Gen. 96090 (1996) 
[hereinafter Op. Neb. Att’y Gen.]. With respect to the decision in Hawaii, the 
Attorney General said: 
New Legislation expressly prohibiting or excluding recognition of 
same-sex marriages under Nebraska law is the only certain way to 
avoid the possibility that Nebraska could be forced to recognize same-
sex marriage licenses issued in Hawaii. Given the existing uncertainty 
under Nebraska law, additional legislation would be required to 
ensure that Nebraska would be protected under DOMA. 
Id. 
74 Id. See also Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting 
Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 791 (1997) (explaining Nebraska’s unicameral 
system, the way in which bills and legislation are passed by unicameral 
government and how it differs from other states’ bicameral legislatures). 
75 See Op. Neb. Att’y Gen., supra note 73, at 2. 
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ban.76 This prompted activists opposing same-sex marriage to 
pursue a popular initiative.77 The result is Initiative 416 and a 
near-certain legal challenge.78 
II. THE SCOPE OF INITIATIVE 416 
The scope of the second sentence of Initiative 416 is not 
immediately clear on the face of the law. In addition to the first 
sentence’s ban on gay marriage, the second sentence 
encompasses “civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other 
similar same-sex relationships.”79 While Nebraska courts have 
yet to define these terms, they have plenty of guiding precedent 
from other jurisdictions to interpret the second sentence of 
Initiative 416 to mean something more than a marriage.80 
Additionally, drafts of the law that were not submitted to the 
voters also demonstrate that the second sentence of the 
amendment targets other forms of same-sex relationships.81 
                                                          
76 See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, 
at 28-31 (Oct. 11, 2000). The first attempts to pass legislation banning gay 
marriage in Nebraska began in 1996 and were led by the Nebraska Family 
Council (“NFC”). Id. at 28. The group’s efforts, including general 
communication to legislators, a rally at the state Capitol and petition drives, 
were inspired by the recent introduction of L.B. 1260, proposed legislation 
that would have legalized same-sex marriage. Id. The NFC’s work did not 
have any effect that year because it was too late in the session to introduce 
new legislation. Id. The grass-roots foundation laid by these opponents of 
same-sex marriage, however, would inspire others to push for similar 
legislation a few years later. Id. at 28-30. 
77 Id. 
78 See Tom Shaw, Lawsuit Over 416 Readied, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
Nov. 19, 2000 at 1B; John Fulwider, ACLU Hopes to Have 416 in Court by 
January, NEB. ST. PAPER, November 19, 2000. 
79 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.  
80 For an examination of opinions from other jurisdictions, see infra Part 
II.C. 
81 For an examination of the proposed drafts of Initiative 416, see infra 
Part II.B. 
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A. Relationships Covered by Initiative 416 
Nebraska’s legislators clearly targeted civil unions created for 
same-sex partners in Vermont. The chief proponent of Initiative 
416 stated at a public hearing: 
Nebraska will be the first state though to address 
counterfeit or look-alike marriages if this amendment 
passes. Since Vermont sanctioned civil unions during the 
time that we were drafting this amendment, it would have 
been remiss not to have a stated public policy regarding 
backdoor attempts to define marriage by calling it another 
name.82 
Supporters also attempted to address the meaning of “domestic 
partnership” and “other similar same-sex relationship” at these 
public hearings.83 As supporter Guyla Mills stated at a public 
hearing before Initiative 416 was passed: 
Opponents of this initiative also state that this language is 
ambiguous and vague. The terms civil unions and 
domestic partnerships are terms that have been coined to 
grant homosexual partner relationships.84 
Unfortunately, statements like this do not clarify the law’s true 
breadth, and reveal only that the drafters targeted more than just 
marriage. 
Initiative 416 may also implicate privately created benefits. 
Hawaii’s gay marriage ban states, for example, that the law has 
                                                          
82 Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, at 
31 (Oct. 11, 2000). Guyla Mills, a lobbyist for the Nonpartisan Family 
Coalition, was one of the sponsors of the Nebraska amendment defining 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Id. She also serves as 
Chairperson of the Defense of Marriage Amendment Committee, which was 
the group responsible for securing enough signatures to place this amendment 
on the ballot. 
83 Id. at 32. Domestic partnerships have commonly been understood to 
mean either business relationships or cohabitation. Id. The proponents of this 
amendment contend that sanctioning same-sex unions will inevitably result in 
businesses being forced to provide state benefits because they too are domestic 
partnerships. Id. 
84 Id. 
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no implications on private solemnization of marriage, while 
Nebraska’s does not.85 Many businesses offer insurance benefits 
and bereavement leave to employees with same-sex partners.86 To 
obtain these benefits, an employee may have to sign a “domestic 
partner affidavit” to establish that their partner is entitled to 
health benefits.87 Initiative 416 could be used by insurance 
companies to justify denying benefits to same-sex domestic 
partners in Nebraska. 
Domestic partnerships are also occasionally established at the 
local or municipal level. For example, San Francisco and New 
York have created registries through which city employees can 
obtain health benefits for their partners.88 This may also be an 
issue for other governmental entities, like the University of 
Nebraska, which recently proposed to grant same-sex partner 
benefits.89 Because the University is a government entity, 
                                                          
85 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (1999). 
86 See More Companies Offering Same-Sex Partner Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 2000, at C2 (finding more companies than ever before are offering 
health benefits to partners of gay and lesbian employees); Leigh Strope, More 
Same-Sex Benefits Offered, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 2, 2001 (reporting that the 
number of “Fortune 500” employers offering same-sex domestic partnership 
benefits rose from 61 in 1998 to145 in 2001 and the larger and more 
prominent the corporation is, the more likely it is to offer such benefits), 
available at http://www.biz.yahoo.com/apf/011002/domestic_partners_1.html 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2002). See also Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Partial Summary of Domestic Partner Benefits Listings, available at 
www.lambdalegal.org. 
87 See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, 
at 69 (Oct. 12, 2000). 
88 See Slattery v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1999) 
(upholding New York City’s jurisdiction for domestic partnership benefits and 
holding New York City domestic partnership law does not conflict with New 
York State law or public policy); Associated Press, Domestic-Partner Law is 
Upheld in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at 40; see also Katherine Q. 
Seelye, Gay Policy in San Francisco Draws Penalty in House, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 1998, at 18A (reporting that the San Francisco House of 
Representatives narrowly passed a measure that would deny Federal housing 
money to San Francisco because the city supports live-in homosexual 
partners). 
89 See Ray Parker, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Approves Health 
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Initiative 416 could prohibit it from recognizing same-sex 
relationships. 
In addition to programs and laws that specifically provide 
benefits to same-sex partners, some laws of general applicability 
have been interpreted to protect same-sex partners in Nebraska. 
For example the state law offering domestic violence protection 
and restraining orders is used to protect same-sex partners.90 It is 
as yet unclear whether a court order of protection pursuant to this 
law would be deemed governmental recognition of a “similar 
same sex relationship.” Judicial recognition and enforcement of 
contracts entered into by same-sex partners could also be banned 
under Initiative 416. Gay partners routinely create contracts to 
establish some of the rights and obligations obtained 
automatically upon marriage—416 could bar judicial enforcement 
of these contracts.91 
                                                          
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, at http://www.inform.umd.edu/EdRes/Topic/ 
Diversity/Specific/Sexual_Orientation/Issues/Benefits/unl.html (last modified 
Apr. 18, 2000). The University of Nebraska proposed to grant same-sex 
partners of faculty members the same health and insurance benefits that 
spouses of heterosexual faculty members receive. Id. 
90 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (2000). The statute, titled “Protection 
order; restraining order; violation; arrest,” reads: 
A peace officer shall with or without a warrant arrest a person if (1) 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has 
committed a violation of an order issued pursuant to section 42-924, a 
violation of section 42-925, a violation of an order excluding a person 
from certain premises issued pursuant to section 42-357, or a 
violation of a valid foreign protection order recognized pursuant to 
section 42-931 and (2) a petitioner under section 42-924 or 42-925, 
an applicant for an order excluding a person from certain premises 
issued pursuant to section 42-357, or a person protected under a valid 
foreign protection order recognized pursuant to section 42-931 
provides the peace officer with a copy of a protection order or an 
order excluding a person from certain premises issued under such 
sections or the peace officer determines that such an order exists after 
communicating with the local law enforcement agency. 
Id.  
91 See JOHNETTE DUFF, SPOUSAL EQUIVALENT HANDBOOK (1992). This 
book advises couples of ways to use comprehensive agreements and contracts 
in lieu of a state-sanctioned marriage. See also Lambda Legal Defense and 
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Education Fund, Life Planning: Legal Documents for Lesbians and Gay Men 
(1998) [hereinafter Lambda Life Planning] (discussing documents gay and 
lesbian couples are advised to draft in order to counter state legal 
presumptions regarding property, health care, and family in the event of death 
or disability), available at http://lambdalegal.org/sections/library/lifeplanning. 
pdf. The handbook promotes documents including powers of attorney, wills, 
living wills, revocable trusts, parenting agreements, living together 
agreements and funeral arrangement agreements. Id. Wills and revocable 
trusts are both tools that allow a deceased party to pass property upon death 
and defeat state intestate succession laws that distribute property based on 
familial ties. While a will must be recorded in a public office, a revocable 
trust does not, making it a more attractive alternative to lesbian and gay 
couples because it bypasses probate administration. Id. at 7, 19. Living 
together agreements deal with the division of property during the partner’s 
lifetime as opposed to after death. These agreements address financial 
obligations regarding income and expenses, ownership of property and the 
distribution of property in the event the relationship ends. Id. at 9. A power of 
attorney authorizes a specified party to act on the principal’s behalf regarding 
personal, medical, business, or financial decisions. Id. at 6, 14. The power of 
attorney can be drafted to authorize such decisions for general activities, for 
specific transactions and time periods, or only upon the principal’s incapacity. 
Id. While living wills do not provide any benefits to partners, they do provide 
instructions to health care providers regarding life support systems in the event 
of a terminal illness or injury and an original copy of the document should be 
provided to a trusted companion. Id. at 6, 16. Additionally, a health care 
proxy allows the designation of a representative authorized to make health care 
decisions when the principal is unable to do so. See also Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Advance Planning (Dec. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=935. 
Parenting agreements allow partners to nominate a guardian who is not a 
legally recognized parent of a child. Lambda Life Planning, supra, at 20. 
Although the contract itself is not enforceable in court because courts must use 
the best interest of the child standard in awarding custody of minor children, 
the document can be used as evidence of a relationship in the court 
proceeding. Id. at 7, 20. 
 While any legally competent adult can draft these documents, such 
documents are always open to attack on the grounds of incompetence, undue 
influence, fraud or duress. Id. at 3. Courts, however, have consistently held 
such contracts enforceable absent any of the above grounds. See, e.g., Posik 
v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1997) (finding that contracts between 
unmarried adults are enforceable unless based on sexual services, thereby 
validating a lesbian couple’s contract containing a provision requiring a 
monthly living expense payments if the contract was breached); Crooke v. 
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B. Proposed Drafts—Defining the Scope of 416 
Read in sum, the various drafts and object clauses preceding 
the language actually adopted for Initiative 416 clearly 
demonstrate the intent to encompass more than marriage. One 
un-adopted draft states, “Only a marriage between one man and 
one woman shall be recognized in Nebraska.”92 Rejection of this 
version indicates that supporters of the law deemed it inadequate 
for their purposes. 
The earlier drafts also suggest that the supporters’ true goal 
was not simply to ban gay marriage, but to deny any other 
method of conferring the rights and benefits of marriage upon 
same-sex partners. One version states “[t]he unique status, 
benefits, rights and protections of marriage as of January 1, 
2000, shall be reserved solely to a man and a woman united in 
marriage.”93 This version implies that insurance and inheritance 
rights, for example, could not be conferred upon unmarried 
same-sex partners. 
Finally, the “object clause” of the version submitted to voters 
fails to elucidate the intended scope.94 It states: 
                                                          
Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga.1992) (finding a contract addressing the division 
of lesbian couple’s property was valid, reversing the lower court’s decision to 
the contrary); Silver v. Starrett, 176 Misc. 2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) 
(finding that there was no duress in the execution of a separation agreement 
granting property rights between a lesbian couple, and, therefore, the 
agreement was enforceable). 
 If such contracts are now banned for gays, they remain a viable option for 
heterosexuals. This raises equal protection issues that will be addressed in this 
paper. See supra Part V. 
92 See Nonpartisan Family Coalition, Draft Petitions to Add Language to 
Nebraska Constitution (April 19, 2000; May 24, 2000) [hereinafter Draft 
Petitions] (on file with author). 
93 Draft Petitions (April 19, 2000), supra note 92, at 5. 
94 Nebraska law requires that public initiative measures have an “object 
clause.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1401 (2002). The law directs the public to 
“print a concise statement in large type of the legal effect of the filing of the 
petition and the object sought to be secured by submitting the measure to the 
vote.” Id. (describing the form of petition required for initiating any law or 
any amendment to Nebraska’s Constitution). See also Alan E. Peterson, Term 
Limits: The Law Review Article, Not The Movie, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 767, 
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The purpose of this proposed change in the Nebraska 
Constitution is to define clearly marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman, to provide that only 
marriage between one man and one woman, whether 
contracted in Nebraska or outside Nebraska, shall be 
recognized in Nebraska, and to declare that same-sex civil 
unions, domestic partnerships, or similar same-sex 
relationships are not valid or recognized in Nebraska.95 
Because this clause merely restates the petition language, it does 
little to reveal the objective of the law. When read together with 
various proposed drafts, however, the object clause strongly 
suggests that the adopted version of 416 covers much more than 
marriage. 
C. Guidance from Other Jurisdictions to Determine the Scope 
of Initiative 416 
Nebraska’s courts have not addressed many of the definitional 
issues regarding the terms employed in Initiative 416. In fact, the 
only place in Nebraska law that currently includes any of these 
terms is business law, which uses the term “domestic 
partnership.”96 Others states and cities recognizing same-sex 
partnerships have faced court challenges to define these terms.97 
                                                          
782, 783 (1998) (discussing the misleading nature of the object clause in the 
Nebraska term limits initiative in that it failed to mention that the limits 
applied to state legislators). 
95 Draft Petitions (May 24, 2000), supra note 92. 
96 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-451(2) (2000). Although the statute is part 
of the Uniform Partnership Act governing the effect of a business partnership 
merger, it explicitly refers to a domestic partnership. Id. In relevant part, the 
statute reads, “The Secretary of State of this state is the agent for service of 
process in an action or proceeding against a surviving foreign partnership or 
limited partnership to enforce an obligation of a domestic partnership or 
limited partnership that is a party to a merger.” Id. 
97 See, e.g., Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, The State 
Univ., 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (refusing to include domestic 
partners in the definition of dependents for the purpose of health insurance 
coverage); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1995) 
(holding that the city did not have the power to grant health care benefits to 
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For example, in Slattery v. City of New York, a taxpayer group 
unsuccessfully challenged the City’s extension of health benefits 
to domestic partners of municipal employees of both the same 
and opposite sex.98 The plaintiffs argued that the City attempted 
to define marriage, recognize a de-facto common law marriage, 
acted in conflict with the state’s power to confer health benefits 
and granted gay domestic partners marital status.99 The court 
rejected these arguments, finding that benefits and municipal 
registries did not constitute marriage.100 One important distinction 
for the court was that “domestic partnerships” were created 
without any of the formal requirements of marriage.101 
The Supreme Court of Colorado reached a similar conclusion 
in Schaefer v. City & County of Denver.102 There, a local law 
                                                          
domestic partners because such benefits were limited to “spouses” and 
“dependants” in the state enabling statute and domestic partners do not fall 
within either of those definitions). 
98 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
99 Id. at 685. Plaintiffs also alleged that the laws illegally recognized 
common law marriages and that the City had exceeded statutory and 
constitutional authority and attempted to give domestic partnerships a marital 
status despite the absence of authority. Id. 
100 Id. at 686. The court stated: 
Requirements regulating marriages . . . are far more stringent than 
those regulating domestic partnerships. . . . [A] marriage must be 
solemnized by an authorized religious leader or an authorized leader 
of the Society for Ethical Culture; the Mayor, city clerk or other 
authorized local official; a New York State or a Federal Judge, or an 
authorized judicial officer. Furthermore, although no particular form 
of ceremony is required, the parties must solemnly declare in the 
presence of the officiator that “they take each other as husband and 
wife.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
101 Id. 
102 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1998). In Schaefer, residents challenged the 
City’s authority to provide health benefits to spousal equivalents of public 
employees. Id. The lower court allowed the City of Denver to extend the 
definition of marriage, thereby allowing a city employee’s domestic partner to 
enjoy the same health benefits as that of a city employee’s marriage partner. 
Id. As in Slattery, the plaintiffs asserted that the City had acted illegally to 
define marriage, an area reserved to the state. Id. at 719. See also supra note 
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creating “spousal equivalents” for the purposes of extending 
health care benefits was held not to be an illegal attempt to re-
define marriage.103 The court stated that “[t]he ordinance 
qualifies a separate and distinct group of people who are not 
eligible to contract a state-sanctioned marriage to receive health 
and dental insurance benefits from the City. Therefore, the 
ordinance does not adversely impact the integrity and importance 
of the institution of marriage.”104 
Additionally, judicial invalidation of municipal provision of 
health benefits for gay couples does not require that the provision 
be construed as re-defining marriage.105 For example, in Lilly v. 
City of Minneapolis the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that 
only the State could determine who was entitled to government 
health care benefits.106 Municipalities can extend benefits only as 
                                                          
99 and accompanying text (articulating the legal challenges presented in 
Slattery). 
103 Schaefer, 973 P.2d at 721. 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (finding the municipality’s interpretation of a statute to benefit 
same-sex domestic partners as usurping the legislature’s intent in crafting the 
law); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 521 (Ga. 1995) 
(concluding that the city exceeded its power to provide benefits to employees 
and their dependents by recognizing domestic partners as “a family 
relationship” and providing employee benefits to them “in a comparable 
manner . . . as for a spouse”); Devlin v. City of Phila., 809 A.2d 980, 993 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that inclusion of two unmarried, unrelated 
people who live together as life partners did not fall within the statutory 
guidelines enumerating the class for tax benefits). 
106 527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1995). The City of Minneapolis passed 
a resolution providing reimbursement to city employees for health care 
insurance costs for same-sex domestic partners. Id. at 108. The resolution also 
permitted health insurance reimbursement for certain classes of blood 
relatives. Id. The ordinance attempted to “provide employee health care 
benefits to persons not defined as ‘spouse’ or ‘dependents’ in a general state 
statute concerning the grant of health care benefits to municipal employees.” 
Id. at 109. The plaintiff in Lilly was a resident of Minneapolis who sought to 
enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance. Id. The court noted that 
Minneapolis was a “home rule” charter city, which meant that the city could 
legislate as to “matters of a purely local nature.” Id. at 113. Since conferring 
health insurance is a statewide matter, the court found that Minneapolis’ 
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permitted by the state.107 Accordingly, the City of Minneapolis’ 
attempt to grant benefits to city employees’ “domestic partners” 
was illegal on this basis, not because the law constituted local 
recognition of gay marriage.108 
These decisions are significant because, when supporters of 
Initiative 416 speak of “domestic partnerships” and “same-sex 
relationships,” they refer to relationships that courts have defined 
as not meaning marriage. This includes state-sanctioned civil-
unions,109 contracts creating domestic partnerships,110 as well as 
informal partnerships created when health benefits are offered to 
same-sex partners.111 Initiative 416 has potential implications for 
gay couples in myriad contexts, therefore, including denial of 
recognition of non-marriage partnerships, contracts, health 
benefits, municipally created registries and requests for 
protection from domestic violence. 
III. INITIATIVE 416 AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Nebraska’s Initiative 416 does more than deny same-sex 
partners the right to have extra-jurisdictionally created civil 
                                                          
actions were ultra vires and “without legal force or effect.” Id. 
107 Id. at 111. 
108 Id. at 108. 
109 See Sarah Schweitzer, Civil Unions in VT: Easier to Enter Than Exit, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2002, at A1 (noting that civil unions are marriages 
in all but name). 
110 Contracts between non-marital partners are routinely enforced. See, 
e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that express 
contracts between non-marital co-habitants may be enforced and in the absence 
of an express contract, the court may find a contract implied in law); Salzman 
v. Bachrach, 999 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 2000) (holding that agreement between 
non-marital cohabitants did not violate public policy); Boland v. Catalano, 521 
A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987) (holding that the existence of a sexual relationship 
between the parties did not preclude the existence of an express agreement 
between a non-marital couple). 
111 See Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1998) 
(holding that a city ordinance granting health care benefits to spousal 
equivalents was matter of local concern that was not preempted by state 
statute). 
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unions and reciprocal beneficiary status recognized in the state. It 
also denies gays the right to petition Nebraska’s legislature for 
the creation or recognition of non-marriage relationships like 
civil unions, domestic partnerships,112 registries113 and perhaps 
even partner health benefits, by foreclosing legal recognition of 
virtually any domestic arrangement or agreement between same-
sex couples.114 This sweeping, extraordinary limitation presents 
distinct questions as to whether the amendment violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.115 
                                                          
112 See Slattery v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683, 683 (Sup. Ct. 
1999) (discussing a New York City law that recognizes certain rights of a 
domestic partnership, while emphasizing the difference between a domestic 
partnership and a marriage). 
113 While these types of unions are not widely available for heterosexual 
or homosexual couples in the United States, they do exist for gays in several 
European countries. France has created an unmarried partners registry that is 
like a contract for same-sex and opposite-sex couples. See Suzanne Daley, 
France Gives Legal Status to Unmarried Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, 
at A3 (discussing a law passed by the French Parliament that gives legal status 
to unmarried couples as well as homosexual couples allowing them the same 
rights as married couples with respect to tax advantages, inheritances, 
housing, and social welfare). Despite passage of the French law, activists 
protested the law, stating that it gave homosexual unions a lower status than 
marriage. Id. Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have also 
created civil unions for gay couples, followed by the Netherlands, which has 
recently permitted same-sex partners to marry. See Reuters, Same Sex Dutch 
Couples Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at 
A8. (discussing a new law passed in the Netherlands that affords same-sex 
couples the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry and adopt children 
and acknowledging similar laws in other European countries). The 
Netherlands is the first nation to offer gays the right to marry. Id. 
114 As noted, the second sentence of Nebraska’s Initiative 416 was 
broadly drafted and declares that a “civil union, domestic partnership or other 
similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.” 
See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. 
115 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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A. Protection of Gays, As a Class, Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Initiative 416 implicates the Fourteenth Amendment because 
non-married heterosexuals can petition the state legislature to 
confer legal rights to opposite-sex partners, while homosexuals 
cannot.116 Additionally, depending upon the scope of the law in 
application, Initiative 416 may deny homosexuals the right to 
petition for domestic partner benefits programs and registries at 
the state or municipal level.117 Finally, if Initiative 416 does 
implicate contractual relationships, gay cohabitation contracts that 
create domestic partnerships would be unenforceable in courts, 
while unmarried heterosexual couples would retain this 
alternative to marriage.118 
Homosexuals are a cognizable group under the Equal 
Protection Clause, which bars any state from denying “to any 
                                                          
116 The inclusion of “same-sex” in the text of Nebraska’s amendment 
explicitly treats individuals involved in same-sex relationships differently than 
those in opposite-sex relationships. This unequal treatment conflicts with the 
principles of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as it 
has been construed and applied by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-35 (1996). The Romer Court stated that 
“[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its 
parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” Id. at 
633. The Court further added, “‘Equal protection of the laws is not achieved 
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.’” Id. 
117 For an explanation as to whether Initiative 416 could prevent 
recognition of same-sex contracts and relationships in the context of 
municipal, local or even employment level, see supra Part IV.C (discussing 
cases from other jurisdictions in which local and municipal laws governing 
same-sex relationships were struck down on the basis that the laws usurped the 
State’s power to define marriage and marital relations). 
118 As noted, the second sentence of Initiative 416 explicitly bans 
recognition of non-marital unions or contracts only in the context of same-sex 
relationships, allowing opposite-sex non-marital unions or contracts to be 
cognizable by courts or the legislature. See supra Part III (discussing the scope 
of Initiative 416 and the legislative intent to reach all permutations of 
homosexual unions). 
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”119 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Romer 
v. Evans, and found that laws based on sexual orientation are not 
subjected to strict scrutiny.120 Rather, the applicable standard in 
this context is “if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor 
targets a suspect class . . . the legislative classification [will be 
upheld] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate 
end.”121 In Romer, the Court reviewed a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that barred government protection for sexual 
orientation based discrimination.122 Several municipalities in the 
state had passed laws attempting to do just that—make 
discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal.123 The Supreme 
Court determined that the Colorado law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because gays as a class were barred from 
                                                          
119 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
120 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer the court struck down an amendment 
to Colorado’s Constitution that precluded all legislative, executive or judicial 
action designed to protect the status of persons based on their homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships. Id. The 
level of scrutiny eventually agreed upon by the Colorado Supreme Court was 
strict scrutiny, which was not satisfied and the enforcement of the amendment 
was enjoined. Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed but did not apply 
strict scrutiny and struck down the law on the basis that it seemed 
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.” Id. at 632. See also Gay 
Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 367 F.Supp. 1088 (D.N.H. 1974). 
Bonner was a civil rights action arising out of the denial by University of New 
Hampshire officials of the right of the Gay Students Organization, a 
homosexual organization to hold “social functions” on the campus. Id. at 
1901. The organization claimed that the denial violated its First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights and requested that the court declare its rights to 
organize and function on the University campus. Id. The New Hampshire 
District Court found that gays students could not be treated dissimilarly from 
other students, rejecting morality as a sound basis for such discrimination, and 
held that once the University granted a particular privilege of holding social 
functions to other campus organizations, the Fourteenth Amendment required 
that the privilege be available to all organizations on an equal basis. Id. at 
1097. 
121 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
122 Id. at 629. 
123 Id. 
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seeking official state protection.124 Although this right remained 
available for all other groups, the Court acknowledged that under 
the challenged legislation “[h]omosexuals [were] forbidden the 
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”125 
Similarly, heterosexual couples in Nebraska may petition the 
government for recognition of non-marriage relationships, while 
homosexuals are effectively barred from doing so. Diluting a 
group’s political or voting power based on a characteristic that 
has no relation to a legitimate state interest is unconstitutional.126 
Under Initiative 416, a distinct group of politically unpopular 
persons is burdened and barred from petitioning elected officials 
for civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other same-sex 
relationships as a means of obtaining the rights associated with 
marriage.127 
Legislation that targets a group of politically unpopular 
persons and denies governmental protection or voting power to 
                                                          
124 Id. at 635. The court stated, “A State cannot so deem a class of 
persons a stranger to its laws. [The Colorado Amendment] violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.” Id. 
125 Id. at 631. See also Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Riverside 
City Council, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting a legislative 
proposal that would deny gays the ability to petition their local council for 
laws barring discrimination). 
126 See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 4 (1971). In Gordon, the Supreme 
Court found that requiring sixty percent approval by the municipality’s voters 
for bond indebtedness gave a minority of the population greater voting power 
than the majority. Id. at 6. Despite this finding, the Court held that in this case 
the voting requirement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because 
there is nothing in the language of the constitution requiring that a majority 
always prevail on every issue. Id. 
127 See Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“[I]f the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the 
very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (citing Dep’t of Agric. 
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))); see also Equal. Found. of Greater 
Cincinnati. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 299 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 
Romer’s description of homosexuals as a “politically unpopular minority”); 
Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1436 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing discrimination against gay military service 
members as “discrimination against an unpopular class”). 
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obtain such protection is also plainly unconstitutional. For 
example in Hunter v. Erickson the Supreme Court refused to 
permit Akron, Ohio to deny racial minorities the right to petition 
for protection against housing discrimination.128 The municipal 
ordinance at issue denied protections in housing, leasing or 
renting based on race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry 
without a voter referendum.129 Protective measures for other 
groups, like those based on gender, political affiliation or pet 
ownership, could merely be enacted by the city council.130 The 
Supreme Court articulated, “[T]he State may no more 
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to 
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote 
or give any group a smaller representation than another of 
comparable size.”131 Accordingly, the ordinance was deemed to 
discriminate against minorities and “constitute[d] a real, 
substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the 
laws.”132 
Initiative 416 has an effect similar to the ordinance at issue in 
Hunter, inasmuch as protective measures, like domestic 
partnership status, offer considerable life security to couples.133 
                                                          
128 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Minority citizens sought a writ of mandamus 
against city officials to prevent them from implementing an Akron city 
ordinance providing that a majority of city voters had to approve any 
amendment to the city charter that would allow the city council to pass an 
ordinance regulating the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing, lease, 
sublease, or financing of real estate on basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin or ancestry. Id. The United Court Supreme Court reversed the Ohio 
Supreme Court and found that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. 
129 Id. at 387. 
130 Id. at 390-91. 
131 Id. at 393. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 387. See, e.g., Women’s Institute for Leadership Development 
for Human Rights, All Our Families Deserve Human Rights (2000) (discussing 
the protective benefits deprived by legislation denying domestic partnership, 
such as hospital visitation rights, shared health insurance coverage and 
property inheritance and ownership rights), available at 
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/all_families.html (last visited Jan. 20, 
2003). 
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These are now nearly impossible for gays to obtain. 
Heterosexuals can petition their representatives for a host of 
rights and protections, although gays cannot. Additionally, as 
noted in Hunter, passage by voter referendum does not immunize 
a law from the Equal Protection Clause.134 Initiative 416 could be 
found unconstitutional based upon the rationale of Hunter 
because it does not bar creation of marriage alternatives or 
benefit programs for all unmarried persons. 
The mere fact that a suspect class is not targeted in Nebraska 
does not mean that the rational basis test will be passed.135 
Politically unpopular groups, whether a suspect class or not, 
cannot be targeted by laws that bear no relation to a legitimate 
state interest.136 The burden Initiative 416 places on gays 
                                                          
134 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392 (noting that “[c]haracterizing [the 
ordinance] simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of 
race relations emphasizes the impact and burden . . . but does not justify it”). 
135 Supreme Court precedent establishes that the rational basis test applies 
in the context of challenges to laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation because homosexuals are not a suspect class. See, e.g., Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641-43 (1996) (stating that rational basis, the normal 
test for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, is the governing 
standard and affirming the Supreme Court of Colorado’s decision that 
homosexuality is not a distinct class); see also Equal. Found. of Greater 
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that it is virtually impossible to distinguish or separate individuals of a 
particular orientation according to a particular sexual conduct); Beller v. 
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808-09 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
military discharge for engaging in homosexual acts would be rational under 
minimal scrutiny because the general military policy of discharging all 
homosexuals is rational). 
136 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532 (1973). In 
this case, several groups brought a class action lawsuit against the Department 
of Agriculture, its Secretary and other departmental officials seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief against the implementation of section 3(e) of 
the Food Stamp Act. Id. Each one of the groups was deemed ineligible to 
participate in the Food Stamp Program because they had one or more 
unrelated individuals living in their households. Id. at 531. For example, one 
member of the class, Jacinta Moreno, lived with Ermina Sanchez and Ms. 
Sanchez’s three children. Id. Ms. Sanchez cared for Ms. Moreno, a diabetic, 
and they shared common living expenses. Id. Although without Ms. Moreno’s 
residence in the household, Ms. Sanchez and her children would be eligible 
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resembles the issue presented to the Supreme Court in United 
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.137 Moreno was a 
class action challenge to an amendment to the Federal Food 
Stamp Act that rendered ineligible for federal assistance any 
household containing an individual unrelated by blood or 
marriage to any other household member.138 The Court found that 
the law was created to deny federal assistance to people regarded 
as “hippies,” but the government’s expressed goal to eliminate 
fraudulent claims for federal assistance bore no rational relation 
to whether needy persons sharing a household were related.139 
Ultimately, the Court stated, “[B]are congressional desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”140 Similarly, Initiative 416 is narrowly 
drafted, targeting unmarried gay couples, but lacks any 
determination that unmarried gay couples pose a greater threat to 
society than unmarried heterosexual couples. 
B. Initiative 416 Lacks a Rational Relationship to a 
Legitimate State Interest 
Because gays as a class are afforded some protection under 
the Equal Protection Clause, evaluation of the constitutionality of 
the law requires application of the rational basis test.141 No 
                                                          
for $108 worth of food stamps per month, the fact that Ms. Moreno lived in 
the same household with them rendered them all ineligible for assistance. Id. 
at 531-32. The Supreme Court held that the “unrelated person” provision was 
an irrational classification and was invalid under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 533. 
137 Id. at 529. 
138 Id. The statute at issue was the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. § 
2012(e) (1964), amended by 84 Stat. 2048 (1971). 
139 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35. 
140 Id. at 534. 
141 See supra note 135 (discussing application of the rational basis test in 
the context of classification based on sexual orientation); see also Equal. 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 
1997) (finding classification on the basis of sexual orientation in a city 
ordinance subject to the rational basis test); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s decision not 
RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC 4/1/03 2:52 PM 
40 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
rational basis is discernable on the face of the law, nor from the 
three hearings that were conducted to do exactly that—provide a 
record of the proponents’ goals in enacting the law.142 
The Supreme Court set forth the analytical framework for 
determining whether a law has a rational relation to a legitimate 
state interest in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living 
Center.143 The Texas law at issue in Cleburne required a special 
use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded.144 Laws 
concerning mentally retarded persons are subject to the rational 
basis test.145 The Court, however, found the zoning law’s 
“relationship to an asserted goal so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary and irrational.”146 Apartment buildings, 
hospitals, sanitariums, dormitories, nursing homes and private 
                                                          
to hire a female homosexual applicant subject to the rational basis test under 
the Equal Protection Clause); Scott Patrick Johnson, An Analysis of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Decision Making in Gay Rights Cases (1985-2000), 27 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 197 (2001) (discussing the future of homosexual rights in light 
of the Supreme Court’s application of the Equal Protection Clause to sexual 
orientation in Romer); Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection: A Comparison of 
Federal Protection Based on Disability and Sexual Orientation, 6 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 323, 351-54 (2000) (discussing cases where the Equal 
Protection Clause was applied to classifications based on sexual orientation). 
142 See supra Parts I.C, II.A (discussing the intent of Nebraska’s 
legislators in passing Initiative 416); see also supra Part II.B (setting forth the 
various proposed drafts to Initiative 416 and determining the breadth of the 
amendment’s language). 
143 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The “rational basis” test has also been applied, 
for example, to state laws that discriminate on the basis of property ownership 
and when a state prevents aliens from holding local jobs that mimic 
government functions. See, e.g., Quinn v. Millsap 491 U.S. 95, 106-07 
(1989) (using the rational basis test to invalidate a Missouri law that required 
an individual to own real property in the state to be appointed to a government 
board). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a New 
York law that required public school teachers to be United States citizens as 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest). 
144 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436. Specifically, the statute required that a 
special use permit would be required “for the construction of ‘[h]ospitals for 
the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or 
correctional institutions.’” Id. at 436-37. 
145 Id. at 442. 
146 Id. at 446. 
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clubs, among other types of uses, did not require special use 
permits.147 The distinction between many of these uses and group 
homes was particularly elusive, and the Court found that the City 
Council was apparently trying to assuage residents’ prejudice 
against and fears of the mentally retarded, without any supporting 
evidence that a group home posed a special threat to the 
community.148 The Court specifically noted the irrationality of 
barring group homes but permitting facilities of similar 
densities.149 Rather than being based on the legitimate 
government purposes of safety and community stability, “this 
case appear[ed] . . . to rest on an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally retarded . . . . “150 
One example of a law that constitutionally and rationally 
distinguished between two classes of individuals was addressed in 
Heller v. Doe.151 There, the Court upheld a law that distinguished 
between the “mentally retarded” and the “mentally ill,”152 Where 
the State of Kentucky had different standards for the involuntary 
commitment of the two groups.153 Specifically, the mentally 
                                                          
147 For example, homes for drug addicts and the insane did require special 
use permits. Id. at 447. 
148 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. The other factors included the location of 
the home near a school, or within a flood plain. Neither of these concerns was 
unique to the group home, which had been singled out as requiring a permit. 
Id. at 449. 
149 Id. at 449. The Court noted: 
If there is no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other 
uses that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding and 
fraternity houses, it is difficult to believe that the groups of mildly or 
moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 201 
Featherston would present any different or special hazard. 
Id. 
150 Id. at 450. 
151 509 U.S. 312 (1993). 
152 Id. at 315. 
153 Id. The court noted: 
[A]t a final commitment hearing, the applicable burden of proof for 
involuntary commitment based on mental retardation is clear and 
convincing evidence, while the standard for involuntary commitment 
based on mental illness is beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [I]n 
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retarded could be committed when their incapacity was 
established by clear and convincing evidence, while the mentally 
ill had to be proven incapacitated at a higher standard, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.154 This distinction was deemed appropriate 
because mental retardation was usually diagnosed at an earlier 
age and with greater certainty than mental illness.155 Thus the 
distinction bore a rational relation to a legitimate state interest— 
preventing inappropriate involuntary confinement.156 
Heterosexual and homosexual unmarried persons, however, are 
not distinguishable in the same manner as the groups in Heller, 
and Initiative 416 appears to be grounded, absent any other stated 
purpose, solely in prejudice against gays. 
1. Religious Beliefs and Prejudicial Animus 
One common basis propounded at the hearings for Initiative 
416 was religion, an illegitimate basis for state laws.157 
                                                          
commitment hearings for mental retardation, unlike for mental 
illness, ‘guardians and immediate family members’ of the subject of 
the proceeding ‘may participate . . . as if a party to the proceedings,’ 
with all attendant rights, including the right to present evidence and to 
appeal. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 321. 
156 Id. at 328. 
157 The Nebraska statute, according to many of its supporters, is an effort 
to codify a Christian perspective on homosexual partnerships. See, e.g., 
Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, at 100 
(Oct. 12, 2000) (“The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all 
the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their 
wickedness.”). 
 The Constitution expressly forbids the establishment of any state religion. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The test generally applied to such laws examines 
“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . 
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Bd. of 
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (declaring that a state statute 
delegating authority over public schools to a religious group as 
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Supporters of the amendment repeatedly referred to the biblical 
story of Adam and Eve.158 There were also references to the 
“Judeo-Christian” foundation of the United States.159 For 
example, one commentator noted, “Nebraska was settled by men 
and women of Christian faith who worked hard to produce their 
freedom to worship their God in the Church of their choice. The 
foundation of our ancestors’ faith was the Bible, the inspired 
word of God.”160 
In Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme Court 
rejected the contention that anti-miscegenation laws could be 
constitutionally based in religious beliefs.161 There, the trial 
judge, whose decision was later overturned by the Court, invoked 
the intent of “almighty God” to keep the races separate.162 This 
justification plainly did not pass constitutional muster.163 
                                                          
unconstitutional). 
158 See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, 
at 49 (Oct. 11, 2000), 84 (Oct. 12, 2000), 96 (Oct. 12, 2000). 
159 See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, 
at 64 (Oct. 11, 2000) (“It will be determined if we continue to use the Judeo-
Christian mind-set of the founding fathers that established the greatest nation 
ever, or if we will abandon what works and begin changing to a pagan mind-
set that has demonstrated self-destructive repercussions for those using it”). 
160 See Hearing Conducted by Nebraska Secretary of State, supra note 13, 
at 96 (Oct. 12, 2000). Mark Bonkiewicz, a businessman residing in southwest 
Omaha, made this statement. 
161 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring that Virginia’s statute banning interracial 
marriage was an unconstitutional racial classification, in violation of the 
constitutional liberty to marry under due process of law). 
162 Id. at 3. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion quotes the trial judge as 
stating: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, 
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such 
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not 
intend for the races to mix. 
Id. 
163 Id. at 12 (holding that statutes prohibiting interracial marriage 
deprived plaintiffs of “liberty without due process of law in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Id. The Court proceeded 
to say that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
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Religious beliefs can certainly offer no more of a sound a basis 
for laws expressing intolerance for homosexuals than for those 
founded in racial intolerance.164 
Neither can animus and intolerance of same-sex relationships 
be a constitutionally permissible basis for Initiative 416. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Palmore v. Sidoti, “[t]he Constitution 
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. 
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law 
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”165 In Palmore, 
parents were litigating the custody of their daughter.166 The father 
sought to modify a prior judgment granting custody to the 
mother, due to “changed conditions”—the mother’s relationship 
with a black man.167 The father proposed that a child growing up 
                                                          
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 
Id. 
164 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackman J., 
dissenting). 
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the 
behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments 
on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends 
instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law 
beyond its conformity to religious doctrine. 
Id. A thorough analysis of attempts to invoke religion to validate legislative 
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation is beyond the scope of this 
article, although this has been thoughtfully explored elsewhere. See generally 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, 
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public 
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997) (drawing comparisons between sexual 
orientation and religion as “identity characteristic[s] that [are] both physically 
invisible and morally polarizing”); John V. Harrison, Peeping Through the 
Closet Keyhole: Sodomy, Homosexuality, and the Amorphous Right of Privacy, 
74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1087 (2000) (concluding that, despite the nation’s 
efforts to protect sexual liberties, many individuals are still considered 
criminals “because of the way they privately express the most basic of human 
instincts”). 
165 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
166 Id. 430-31. 
167 Id. at 430. The Court articulated the father’s challenge as stating that 
“the child’s mother was then cohabiting with a Negro . . . whom she married 
two months later. Additionally, the father made several allegations of instances 
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in a racially mixed household would potentially face community 
scorn.168 The Florida state courts found credence in this 
argument, though the Supreme Court soundly rejected it.169 
Similarly, in order to uphold Initiative 416, the courts would 
have to come to the improbable conclusion that religious or 
societal intolerance are legitimate bases for unequal treatment of 
homosexuals, but are not adequate bases for unequal treatment of 
the races.170 
                                                          
in which the mother had not properly cared for the child.” Id. 
168 Id. at 430. Specifically, the father presented recommendations from 
the court counselor in an earlier case describing the social consequences of an 
interracial marriage. Id. The lower court accepted the recommendation for a 
change in custody because the wife had “chosen for herself and for her child, 
a life-style unacceptable to the father and to society . . . . The child . . . is, or 
at school age will be subject to environmental pressures not of choice.” Id. 
169 See id. at 431. The Court noted: 
The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial 
classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural 
mother. The Constitution cannot control such prejudice, but neither 
can it tolerate it. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, 
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 
Id. 
170 This conclusion has been noted in other judicial opinions ruling on the 
constitutionality of sexual orientation based legislative classifications. See, 
e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (noting that 
sexual orientation appears to possess most or all of the characteristics that have 
persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional 
scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause); High 
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987) (noting that a Department of Defense policy reflected irrational 
prejudice and outmoded stereotypes and notions about homosexuals); see also 
Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened 
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 
(1984); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality 
as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985). 
 Another commentator has noted that legislative bans on same-sex 
marriages ought to be declared unconstitutional on the same basis that the 
Supreme Court invalidated racially discriminatory marriage statutes. See 
MERIN, supra note 7, at 236. Specifically, Merin states: 
Full recognition of same-sex marriages in the United States will be 
possible only if and when the U.S. Supreme Court decides that both 
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2. Preservation of Marriage 
Another basis put forth for Initiative 416 is that it protects 
and stabilizes the institution of marriage in Nebraska.171 There is 
no evidence, however, that barring gays access to their 
legislators enhances the stability of marriage.172 While protecting 
                                                          
state and federal DOMAs are unconstitutional and that states cannot 
constitutionally invoke a public policy exception to refuse recognition 
of out-of-state same-sex marriages, as it did in the case of anti-
miscegenation laws more than thirty years ago. 
Id. 
171 See Family First, Capitol Watch, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2002) (supporting 
Initiative 416 because it would reinforce the traditional understanding of 
marriage instead of weakening and destroying it by introducing other forms of 
marriage), available at http://www.familyfirst.org/capitolwatch/1000.pdf. See 
also Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at 9 (quoting former Governor Bob Nelson 
saying Initiative 416 “makes a statement for traditional marriage” and that a 
homosexual union “was not a moral relationship”); Stephen Buttry & Leslie 
Reed, Voters OK Same Sex Union Ban, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 8, 
2000, at 1 (quoting Bill Ramsey, Co-Chairman of the Nebraska Coalition for 
the Protection of Marriage, hailing the passage of Initiative 416 as a vital 
message saying, “Marriage as we know it, respect it and love it has been 
preserved”). 
172 See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Get the Facts: 
Talking About the Freedom to Marry: Why Same-Sex Couples Should Have 
Equality in Marriage (June 20, 2001) (arguing that allowing same-sex couples 
to marry promotes stability in the community in the same way opposite sex 
marriage does) at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/ 
record?record=47. The article argues: 
Same-sex couples build their lives together like other couples, 
working hard at their jobs, volunteering in their neighborhoods, and 
valuing the responsibilities and love that their family commitments 
provide to them and to the children they may have. These families 
have everyday concerns, like being financially sound, emotionally 
and physically healthy, and protected by adequate health insurance. 
These concerns heighten when there are children in the family. 
Marriage provides tangible protections that address many of these 
concerns. Promotion of support and security for families is a benefit 
to the entire community; it does not de-stabilize other families. Equal 
access to marriage will also emphasize equality and non-
discrimination for all of society. 
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families and marriages is indisputably a legitimate state interest, 
the amendment bears no rational relation to this end.173 
Initiative 416 was enacted to protect marriage, undoubtedly a 
legitimate state interest. Yet the distinction made between 
unmarried homosexuals and heterosexuals undermines the 
assertion that the law is related to the protection of traditional 
marriage.174 The law is under-inclusive inasmuch as is does not 
                                                          
Id. 
173 State legislatures are permitted to regulate issues of domestic law, and 
state courts are granted jurisdiction to determine issues of application and 
interpretation of these issues. See supra note 11 (discussing the reservation of 
issues of domestic law to the states). Because Initiative 416 limits the rights of 
homosexuals in the State and establishes a legislative distinction between 
heterosexual relationships and homosexual relationships, the amendment will 
merit rational basis scrutiny for examination as to whether the distinction is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See supra Part III.A 
(discussing the application of the rational basis test to legislative classifications 
based on sexual orientation). 
174 Proponents of anti-miscegenation laws in Loving noted that the laws 
applied equally to blacks and whites as an attempt to characterize the laws as 
equitable. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). Initiative 416, 
however, cannot be similarly defended, because gays and heterosexuals are 
treated dissimilarly. 
 Additionally, legislation protecting “traditional” family structures has 
occasionally been rejected by courts on the basis that there is no single 
established definition of the makeup of a “traditional” family. See, e.g., 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (refusing to 
establish a bright line definition of family by “cutting off any protection of 
family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary—the boundary of 
the nuclear family”); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 
(1977) (noting the difficulty of defining family for Due Process purposes and 
considering factors other courts have considered in making such a 
determination); see, Alber v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health & Developmental 
Disabilities, 786 F.Supp. 1340, 1367 n.25 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In Alber, the 
court noted: 
[T]he Supreme Court has specified that neither the traditional 
“boundary of the nuclear family” nor the existence of blood 
relationships nor the legitimacy of a family arrangement under state 
law defines the boundaries of family rights. Lower courts are thus 
free, within the limits marked out by the Court, to determine that a 
particular non-nuclear or non- biological family merits constitutional 
protection. 
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ban non-marriage relationships between heterosexuals, belying 
the proponents’ political animus towards homosexuals.175 This 
sort of political animus rendered the Colorado law at issue in 
Romer v. Evans a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 
Moreover, Nebraska’s courts have already upheld 
cohabitation agreements between unmarried heterosexual 
couples.177 The Supreme Court of Nebraska considered a 
cohabitation agreement in Kinkenon v. Hue and stated that “[t]he 
record shows that sexual services did not form the basis for the 
agreement between the parties. For that reason, this agreement 
does not violate public policy.”178 Implicit in this decision is that 
contracts of cohabitation outside of marriage are not void or 
against the state’s public policy, at least when created between 
heterosexual partners. 
The distinction between gay and heterosexual unmarried 
couples is also undermined by decisions from other jurisdictions. 
For example, in Baehr v. Miike, the Hawaii court determined, 
after extensive hearings, that there were no negative implications 
for children raised by same-sex parents.179 Additionally, the 
                                                          
Id. 
175 As noted, Initiative 416 bans only “same-sex relationships” but does 
not apply to similar arrangements between opposite sex couples. See NEB. 
CONST. art. I, § 29. 
176 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
177 See Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981) (holding that 
parties entered into an oral contract whereby the appellant was to perform 
certain services, including housework, for the appellant in exchange for a 
home to live in for the rest of her life and that this contract was specifically 
enforceable). See also Wolf v. Mangiamele, No. A-97-284, 1998 WL 902572 
(Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1998) (noting that agreements between parties 
engaged in non-marital, but presumptively sexual, relationships, are valid and 
enforceable as long as sexual services do not form the basis of the agreement). 
178 Kinkenon, 301 N.W.2d at 80. 
179 1996 WL 694235, at *5 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The Hawaii 
court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish or prove any 
adverse consequences resulting from same-sex marriage. Id. In its hearings, 
the court found that although a father and a mother provide a child with unique 
paternal and maternal contributions important to the development of a happy, 
healthy and well-adjusted child, such contributions are not essential. Id. The 
evidence presented established that the most important factor in the 
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Supreme Court of Vermont found that denying the benefits and 
protections of marriage to children of same-sex households posed 
a greater risk to families.180 Other courts have arrived at similar 
conclusions in the context of parental custody and adoption 
rights.181 Thus, Initiative 416 not only runs afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it also destroys the very interests it 
seeks to protect—family stability and marriage. 
IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND INITIATIVE 416 
The second sentence of Initiative 416 also violates the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.182 The 
Clause requires that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
                                                          
development of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing 
relationship between parent and child. Id. The sexual orientation of parents is 
not, alone, an indicator of parental fitness and does not automatically 
disqualify them from being good, fit, loving or successful parents. Id. 
180 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999); see also Baehr v. 
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (listing the numerous protections 
afforded families in marriage including child support rights). 
181 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a 
biological mother’s same-sex former domestic partner had standing to seek 
joint legal custody of, and visitation with, mother’s biological children); In re 
Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002) (holding that unmarried same-
sex partners could adopt a child without the legal parent relinquishing his or 
her parental rights); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (finding 
that same-sex couples may have recourse in the courts in the event that a 
custody dispute results from the breakup of relationship); In re B.L.V.B., 628 
A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (holding that an unmarried same-sex partner 
could adopt her partner’s biological child); see also Susan Becker, Re-
Orienting Law and Sexuality: Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in 
Ohio: Unsettled and Unsettling Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101 (2000); 
Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. 
REV. 341 (2002); Linda Whobrey Rohman et al., The Best Interests of the 
Child in Custody Disputes, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY 
DETERMINATIONS 59 (L.A. Weithorn ed., 1987). 
182 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effects thereof.”183 Since no 
state currently allows same-sex marriage, the first sentence of 
Nebraska’s amendment has no immediate implications.184 
Additionally, the so-called “public policy exemption” to the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause may permit states to decline recognition 
of marriages that violate the state’s public policy.185 The federal 
                                                          
183 Id. 
184 As noted, the first sentence of Initiative 416 bans only same-sex 
marriage, and other states have passed similar laws. See supra notes 1, 3 
(discussing the text of Initiative 416 and noting that similar laws have been 
passed in other states). Moreover, the force of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause has been questioned in the context of recognition of out-of-state 
marriages. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 7, at 231 (noting that “it is debatable 
whether the U.S. Constitution will compel such recognition, because the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause has not commonly been relied upon by courts in 
determining whether they should recognize out-of-state marriages (e.g., 
common law marriages) that could not have been performed within the 
jurisdiction”). 
185 See, e.g., Matlock v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 166 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1998). 
In Matlock, the plaintiff filed an application for disabled widow’s insurance 
benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act, on account of a deceased wage 
earner. Id. In denying the application, the court stated the general rule that 
“[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage 
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the 
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant 
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.” Id. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1996) 
(examining the “public policy” exception in the context of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause). 
 There is debate as to whether, in the event one state recognizes the right 
of same-sex couples to marry, other states can avoid recognition of such 
marriages on the basis of this public policy exception. See MERIN, supra note 
7, at 232. Specifically, MERIN notes: 
Notwithstanding the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in situations 
involving marriage validity, and according to traditional choice-of-
law rules, courts have generally followed the rule of lex celebratonis, 
which states that a marriage valid where entered into should be 
recognized as valid everywhere, and the tendency in American 
conflicts cases is to validate marriages entered into in other 
jurisdictions, unless the legislature has rejected the rule of validity or 
the marriage is so abominable that validating it would offend the 
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DOMA reinforced this exception.186 There is, however, no basis 
                                                          
public policy sense of morality. 
Id. Accordingly, and because “each state has its own conflicts doctrine, many 
states look to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1996) for 
direction.” Id. Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., 
Sylvia Law, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Families 
and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 217 (2000) (“Several states, 
such as California, adopted rules stating that any marriage valid in the place 
contracted is valid in their state. Other states take a more restrictive approach 
and refuse to recognize marriages that violate a strong public policy of the 
state.”); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act and the 
Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1439 
(1997) (observing that while the general rule is lex celebrationis, some states 
employ an exception to the rule “if honoring a sister state’s marriage would 
violate an important public policy of the enforcing state”); Note, In Sickness 
and in Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflicts of Laws and Recognition 
of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038, 2043 (1996) (“Although 
each state has its own conflicts doctrine, many states look to the Restatement 
for direction.”). 
186 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 7 (1996) (finding that the purpose of 
the legislation is to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage 
and to protect the rights of the tates to formulate their own public policy 
regarding the legal recognition of same-sex marriages). It should be noted, 
however, DOMA does not require that states recognize same-sex unions. 
 Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., MERIN 
supra note 7, at 228-29. Merin notes that “[a]lthough a provision in DOMA 
allows states not to recognize same-sex marriages performed in another state, 
the act does not mandate that states disregard such marriages.” Id. He further 
states that, “each state needs to determine individually whether to take 
advantage of the act’s exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 229; see also Leonard G. Brown III, 
Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. 
Evans and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159, 
169 (1996) (stating that section 2 of DOMA uses the words, “No State . . . 
shall be required,” which clearly shows that Congress did not intend to require 
a state to do anything; they are merely recognizing an already existing state 
right to disregard an act, judgment or decree when it violates a state’s 
legitimate public policy); Diane M. Gillerman, The Defense of Marriage Act: 
The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 
34 HOUS. L. REV. 425, 463 (1997) (making the argument that DOMA does 
not attempt to govern the resolution of the same-sex marriage issue within 
each state, impose a choice of either recognition or non-recognition on the 
states, attempt to define marriage for state law purposes, impose any 
RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC 4/1/03 2:52 PM 
52 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
for Nebraska to refuse to acknowledge contracts entered into by 
same-sex couples prior to entering the state, as legal instruments 
cannot be denied recognition based on a public policy 
exception.187 Rather, conflicts of laws doctrines require a court to 
determine what law to apply to adjudicate a claim.188 
Nor is there any “‘roving public policy exception’ to the full 
faith and credit due judgments.”189 Cases that are routinely cited 
for such an exception were severely limited in scope by the 
Supreme Court in Baker v. General Motors Corp.190 There, the 
Court stated that “[i]n assuming the existence of a ubiquitous 
‘public policy exception’ permitting one State to resist 
recognition of another State’s judgment, the District Court . . . 
misread our precedent.”191 Accordingly, a decision by one state’s 
court to recognize a contract as legally binding is not necessarily 
                                                          
affirmative law regarding the issue or “commandee[r] the legislative processes 
of the States”). 
187 See MERIN, supra note 7, at 228-31 (discussing the issue of whether a 
state can disregard a legal same-sex marriage of another state based on policy 
reasons); see also Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” 
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 980-81 (1956) (discussing 
the dubious term “public policy” for a state’s justification for having its own 
law applied). 
188 For a more expansive discussion of the matters at issue in conflict of 
law cases, see generally Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1988) (explaining that conflict of laws is the body of 
legal doctrine that seeks to provide a basis for choosing a substantive rule, in 
tort or contract, over the conflicting rule of another state). 
189 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (finding 
that an injunction, entered by a Michigan county court pursuant to parties’ 
stipulation in an employee’s wrongful discharge action, barring a former 
employee from testifying as a witness did not reach beyond the controversy 
between the employee and the manufacturer to control proceedings elsewhere, 
and, therefore, the employee could testify in a Missouri products liability case 
without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Id. 
190 Id. at 234 (finding that there is no public policy exception to the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause). See also Kent County v. Shephard, 713 A.2d 290, 
296-97 (Md. 1998) (stating that the forum state is not required to give Full 
Faith and Credit to the statutes of another state when contemplating an issue 
upon which the forum state is competent to legislate). 
191 Baker, 522 U.S. at 234. 
RIZZOMACRO 3-14.DOC 4/1/03 2:52 PM 
 NEBRASKA’S INITIATIVE 416 53 
one that can be accepted or rejected in another jurisdiction based 
on a supposed divergent “public policy.”192 
Legislators misstated the law in the Congressional Report on 
DOMA, claiming that the “U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a 
public policy exception that, in certain circumstances, would 
permit a State to decline to give effect to another state’s laws.”193 
In fact, one of the two cases Congress relied upon was limited by 
the Supreme Court to mean only that “a court may be guided by 
the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law 
applicable to a controversy” in court.194 The case at issue, 
Nevada v. Hall, speaks only to choice of law.195 There, a vehicle 
owned by the State of Nevada was involved in a traffic accident 
in California.196 The law of Nevada limited the State’s liability 
for tort actions to $25,000.197 California law had no such limit, 
and the California state courts chose to apply California law in 
the case.198 Addressing the controversy, the Supreme Court stated 
that the “Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require one state 
                                                          
192 Id. This question is a matter of significant debate, and the Supreme 
Court has not established a bright-line rule for determining what matters will 
necessarily fall within the domain of mandatory recognition under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 187, at 980-
81 (noting traditional but dubious use of the term “public policy” to obscure 
“an assertion of the forum’s right to have its [own] law applied to the 
[controversy] because of the forum’s relationship to it”). 
193 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 9 (1996). This statement was in 
reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 
424 (1979) (noting the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require States to 
apply another’s law in violation of the State’s own public policy). Id. at 9 
n.27. 
194 See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. In Baker, the Supreme Court invoked 
Nevada v. Hall specifically for the proposition that “[a] court may be guided 
by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law applicable to a 
controversy.” Id. (citing Hall, 440 U.S. at 421-24). The Court immediately 
clarified this position, stating that Supreme Court precedent “support[s] no 
roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.” 
Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)). 
195 440 U.S. at 414 (1979). See also Baker, 422 U.S. at 233. 
196 Nevada, 440 U.S. at 411. 
197 Id. at 412. 
198 Id. at 411. 
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to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events 
within it, the conflicting statute of another state . . .” in the 
context of a court proceeding.199 
The second case specifically cited in DOMA report dealt with 
a similar conflict of laws.200 In Alaska Packers Association v. 
Industrial Accident Commission of California the conflict was 
whether, in the context of determining a worker’s compensation 
award for work-related injuries, “the full faith and credit clause 
[sic] require[d] the state of California to give effect to the Alaska 
statute rather than its own.”201 Public policy was not an issue, 
and the Court examined only which state had greater interest in 
the controversy.202 The Court rejected the argument that full faith 
and credit required application of Alaska law because the contract 
was signed in California and the accident at issue occurred 
there.203 Ultimately, California’s interest in enforcing its 
compensation act outweighed any competing interests of the State 
of Alaska.204 
                                                          
199 Id. at 422-23. 
200 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 9 (1996) (citing Alaska Packers Ass’n 
v. Industrial Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935), to support the proposition 
that “the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a public policy exception that, in 
certain circumstances, would permit a State to decline to give effect to another 
State’s laws”). 
201 294 U.S. at 546 (1935). In Alaska Packers, an employer challenged a 
compensation award that was made in conformity with the statutes of 
California, where the contract of employment was entered into, rather than 
Alaska, where the employment was performed and the injuries occurred. Id. at 
550. 
202 Id. at 548-49. Specifically, the court noted that it was within the power 
of California’s legislature to enact the statute in question and that the state’s 
exercise of that power infringed no constitutional provision. Id. at 548. On the 
issue of conflicting state interests, the court stated that “[p]rima facie every 
state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes . . . One who 
challenges that right . . . assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational 
basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are 
superior to those of the forum.” Id. at 547-48. 
203 Id. at 540. 
204 Id. at 550 (concluding that “[t]he interest of Alaska is not shown to be 
superior to that of California. No persuasive reasoning is shown for denying to 
California the right to enforce its own laws in its own court.”). 
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The second sentence of Initiative 416, insofar as it attempts to 
invalidate domestic partnership unions and contracts entered into 
in other states, is therefore unconstitutional under current 
application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.205 Nebraska 
                                                          
205 Supporters of the Vermont civil unions law have also recognized that 
problems may exist for nonresidents who obtain a civil union license in 
Vermont but seek to enforce in their home state the rights granted by the civil 
union in Vermont. See, e.g., Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Vermont Civil Unions Law to Take Effect: Putting Fairness in Full Swing (June 
30, 2000) (stating that it is unclear how home states sill treat civil unions 
between residents obtaining a Vermont civil union), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi_bin/iowa/documents/record?record=656; 
Vermont Freedom to Marry Organization (cautioning that it is unknown how 
home states will respond to civil unions and encouraging nonresidents to 
continue using contractual means to protect their interests), at 
http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/civilunions.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2002). 
Additionally, the Vermont Secretary of State warns of potential problems 
nonresidents may encounter in the dissolution of a civil union. See Vermont 
Office of the Secretary of State, The Vermont Guide to Civil Unions, available 
at http://www.sec.state.vt.us/otherprg/civilunions/civilunions.html (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2003) (warning that although dissolution of civil unions is 
handled by the Vermont Family Court, there is a residency requirement, and it 
is unclear how other states will handle civil union dissolutions). 
 Furthermore, it appears that states with statutes that conflict with the 
Vermont civil union law, or any law providing domestic partnership benefits, 
may have a slight barrier in applying state law to the enforcement of such 
contracts. The Supreme Court has held that a forum state does not violate the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause by electing to apply its own substantive law to a 
matter of contract interpretation as long as the forum state has sufficient 
contacts with the parties or occurrences that would not render the application 
of the law arbitrary or unfair. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
302 (1981) (allowing Minnesota to apply its law to an insurance contract 
executed by Wisconsin drivers in Wisconsin); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 
(1955) (agreeing that an Arkansas court could apply Arkansas law to an 
employment contract executed between a Missouri employee and employer); 
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (upholding 
application of Louisiana law to an action against an insurer on a policy even 
though the contract was negotiated and issued in Massachusetts). The common 
theme in each of these cases is that the forum state had significant contacts 
with the parties, justifying application of its own law. 
 Another example is Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2002). In Rosengarten, Connecticut residents obtained a civil union in 
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cannot refuse to recognize rights or benefits extended to 
homosexuals under valid, enforceable contracts enacted in other 
states.206 Supreme Court precedent sets forth a method to 
determine which state’s law to apply to adjudicate a controversy 
regarding an incident, instrument or contract from another state, 
but does not permit a state to deny recognition of a contract on 
the basis of its fundamental validity. There is no public policy 
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause that would permit 
them to do so.207 
                                                          
Vermont and sought to dissolve the union under Connecticut family relations 
law. Id. at 172-74. The Connecticut court, applying Connecticut family law, 
found that the Vermont civil union was not a family relations matter as defined 
in the Connecticut statute, and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to 
dissolve a civil union not recognized by Connecticut law. Id. at 175-76, 179-
80. 
206 As noted, the argument that such a decision would fall within the 
“public policy” exception of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is debatable, and 
some commentators have argued that only marriages performed in other states 
could be unenforceable if challenged. See, e.g., MERIN, supra note 7, at 231. 
But see L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and 
Same-Sex “Marriage”: How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 30, 36 (1998) (noting the continued vitality of the 
public policy exception to choice of law and the ability of states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages using the exception as a moral objection to 
homosexual acts); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex “Marriage” and the Public 
Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 47 (1998) (arguing that a home 
state clearly has the right to refuse recognition of an out-of-state same-sex 
marriage using the public policy doctrine and that constitutional objections to 
such a conclusion based on violation of the Establishment Clause or 
discrimination against the sister state are unfounded). 
207 Even if the public policy exception were well settled, it could be 
considered inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent to invoke the exception 
in the context of marriage. See MERIN, supra note 7, at 235. Merin points out 
that, even if the public policy exception in the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
were available to defend state and federal DOMAs, and these laws “passed 
constitutional muster, there are scholars who claim that states would still be 
obliged to recognize out-of-state marriages, building on precedents pertaining 
to recognition of interracial marriages, according to which it would be wrong 
to invoke a public policy exception for same-sex marriages.” Id. at 235 n.289 
(citing Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public 
Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998); Mark Strasser, For Whom the Bell Tolls: 
On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 66 U. 
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V. INITIATIVE 416 AND THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE 
The Contracts Clause of the Constitution, mandating that 
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts” may also present fertile ground for legal challenges 
to Initiative 416.208 Gay couples routinely enter into contracts to 
provide a measure of security in their relationships.209 These 
contracts create, among other things, inheritance rights, powers 
of attorney and insurance rights.210 The sum result is a 
relationship commonly referred to as a “domestic partnership.” 
Some commentators fear that the second sentence of Initiative 
416 would bar judicial enforcement of such contracts in the event 
that a court interprets them as creating a “domestic partnership” 
or “same-sex relationship.”211 
A. Current Application of the Contracts Clause 
The Contracts Clause applies only to state laws that are very 
likely to implicate contracts, and the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
CIN. L. REV. 339 (1998)). 
208 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
209 See generally, DUFF, supra note 91 (discussing “spousal equivalent” 
contracts); see also Lambda Life Planning, supra note 91 (exploring the 
various types of documents drafted to create legal rights and remedies to same-
sex couples). 
210 See Lambda Life Planning, supra note 91 and accompanying text 
(illustrating various contracts and legal documents protecting the rights of 
same-sex couples). 
211 See Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay 
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at A9 (discussing fear that the 
amendment would dissuade employers and insurers from offering health 
benefits for same-sex partners, and that government agencies and institutions 
would interpret Initiative 416 in such a way as to prevent gays from making 
decisions about their hospitalized partners or adoption of their partner’s 
children); Leslie Reed, Gays Fear Measure’s Effect on Contracts, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 15, 2000. Reed analogizes marriage to a contract, and 
suggests that without honoring the relationship, you cannot honor the contract. 
Id. Similarly, contracts held by a gay partner providing benefits might be 
legally challenged by “anti-gay groups, by estranged family members or even 
by insurance carriers reluctant to pay on a large claim.” Id. 
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explicitly declared that it “will not strain to reach a constitutional 
question by speculating that [one state’s] courts might in the 
future interpret” the law to implicate contracts.212 There is, 
however, no leap of reasoning required to find that Initiative 416 
will cover contracts between same-sex partners. 
The Supreme Court has articulated two standards to examine 
claims of state imposed impairment of contracts. The more 
stringent rule was outlined in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus.213 First, there must be a substantial impairment of 
contractual rights.214 To be upheld, the impairment must (1) 
address an emergency; (2) protect a basic societal interest and not 
a favored group; (3) be appropriately tailored; (4) impose only 
reasonable conditions on contracts; and (5) be of limited 
duration.215 Allied involved a challenge to a Minnesota state law 
that targeted a specific corporation and altered its pension 
                                                          
212 Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 189 (1983). In Exxon, 
Alabama oil and gas producers sought a declaration that an Alabama statute 
increasing severance tax on oil and gas extracted from Alabama wells while 
exempting royalty owners from the increase and prohibiting producers from 
passing the cost increase on to their consumer-purchasers was unconstitutional. 
Id. The Supreme Court held that the royalty-owner exception did not violate 
the Contracts Clause because the exemption did not suggest that any 
contractual obligations of which appellants were the beneficiaries would be 
nullified. Id. 
213 438 U.S. 234 (1978). In Allied Structural Steel an employer 
challenged a state law, the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, under 
which a private employer of 100 or more employees who provided pension 
benefits and met other specified requirements, was subject to a “pension 
funding charge” if he terminated the plan or closed the Minnesota office. Id. 
at 236. The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Contracts Clause. Id. at 251. 
214 Id. at 245 (“Severe impairment . . . will push the inquiry to a careful 
examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation” in light of “the 
high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.”). Here, 
the court found the Act severe because a basic term of the pension contract 
was substantially modified. Id. at 246. The change was one the company 
“relied on heavily, and reasonably . . . in calculating its annual contributions 
to the pension fund.” Id. 
215 Id. at 242. 
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contracts,216 expanding the company’s payout obligations to 
retired employees.217 The Supreme Court overturned the statute, 
finding that it violated each of the requirements of the Contracts 
Clause and stating that Minnesota “grossly distorted” the 
contractual relationships of the corporation to its employees.218 
The second test applicable to laws allegedly impairing 
contracts was articulated in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. 
Kansas Power & Light Co.219 The Court did not overturn the 
Allied test, but modified it to incorporate the following three 
questions: (1) has a substantial impairment of contractual rights 
taken place; (2) is there a significant and legitimate public 
purpose; (3) if there is a valid public purpose, is the adjustment 
of contractual rights appropriate to that public purpose?220 The 
Court applied this test to a Kansas law placing price caps on the 
sale of natural gas that were more stringent than those to which 
suppliers and purchasers agreed.221 There, the substantial 
impairment had an important public purpose—protecting 
consumers from indefinite price increases due to energy 
deregulation.222 The law was appropriately tailored because it 
simply slowed price increases and supplemented federal 
regulation of intrastate gas prices.223 These cases demonstrate 
                                                          
216 Id. at 239. Specifically, the plaintiff employer challenged the 
Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act. The 1974 law provided 
that a private employer with at least 100 employees, among which at least one 
was a Minnesota resident, was subject to a pension funding charge if he 
terminated the pension plan or closed the Minnesota office. MINN. STAT. § 
181B.01 (1974). 
217 Id. at 240. The Minnesota law “substantially altered those 
relationships by superimposing pension obligations upon the company, 
conspicuously beyond those that it had voluntarily agreed to undertake.” Id. 
218 Id. at 249. 
219 459 U.S. 400 (1983). 
220 Id. at 411-12. 
221 Id. at 413-19. 
222 Id. at 417. The Court specifically noted that “Kansas has exercised its 
police power to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices 
caused by deregulation.” Id. 
223 Id. at 417. The Court reasoned that the state had a legitimate interest 
in “correcting the imbalance between the interstate and intrastate markets,” 
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that, while the Contracts Clause does not obliterate states’ police 
power, the Constitution limits the extent to which states can 
interfere with contracts.224 
B. Application of Contracts Clause Principles to Initiative 416 
Analysis of the Nebraska law begins with considering 
whether it actually impairs contractual rights. Scrutiny would 
then turn on whether adjustment of those contractual rights 
furthers a significant and legitimate public interest. 
1. Substantial Impairment 
The reality of gay couples in the United States is that 
contracts are essential mechanisms to delineate relationships, 
both between same-sex partners and gay employees and their 
employers.225 Therefore any court reviewing Initiative 416 need 
not “speculate” that the law will apply to same-sex relationships 
                                                          
because it was “coordinat[ing] the intrastate and interstate prices by 
supplementing the federal Act’s regulation of intrastate gas.” Id. The Court 
further justified the Kansas act by stating that Congress had contemplated this 
type of supplementation, as evidenced in the House and Senate Conference 
Reports on the federal act. The court quoted the conference reports which 
stated that the federal act was not to invalidate any State’s authority to 
establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for sales of gas in intrastate 
commerce, including any indefinite price escalator clause, not exceeding the 
applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under Title I of the Act. Id. at 417 
(quoting S. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1126, at 124-25 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-
1752, at 124-25 (1978)). 
224 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 428 U.S. 234, 240 (1978) 
(noting that the Contracts Clause “is not, however, the Draconian provision 
that its words might seem to imply”); see also Samuel R. Olken, Charles 
Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of Contract 
Clause Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 516 (1993) (providing a historical 
analysis of the Contracts Clause jurisprudence to suggest that the Supreme 
Court has tried to keep states from interfering with contracts while recognizing 
the importance of state governmental police powers). 
225 See Lambda Life Planning, supra note 91 and accompanying text 
(discussing the use of contracts and other legal documents created to protect 
and define the rights and obligations of same-sex couples). 
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built upon contracts.226 
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis the 
Supreme Court addressed a law that did not directly implicate 
contractual relations but had a substantial impact on them.227 The 
law at issue required coal-mining companies to leave fifty percent 
of coal in mines to prevent dangerous cave-ins at the surface.228 
Coal mining companies routinely owned or leased subsurface 
mineral rights, and the surface owners faced the risk of cave-
ins.229 Because the statute required that certain amounts of coal be 
                                                          
226 As noted, the Supreme Court has declared that it will refuse to 
speculate as to whether a legislative scheme will interfere with contract rights. 
See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 189 (1983). 
227 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The primary purpose of the law at issue in 
DeBenedictis was to impose financial liability on mine operators that caused 
damage. Id. at 486. Although this has a secondary effect on contractual 
negotiations because it prevented operators from holding surface owners to 
their contractual waiver of liability for surface damage, the Court found that 
Pennsylvania had appropriately exercised its police power. Id. at 488, 502. 
228 Id. Specifically, the act mandated that fifty percent of the coal beneath 
certain structures remain in place and provided that if removal damaged these 
designated structures, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Resources could revoke the operator’s mining permit. Id. at 477. Coal 
companies challenged the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act as a violation of the 
Takings and Contracts clauses of the Constitution. Id. See also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 10; U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 6. To prevent revocation, operators 
had to either repair the damage within six months, satisfy any claims arising 
from the damage or deposit as security the cost of the repairs. Keystone, 480 
U.S. at 477. 
229 Id. When coal is mined and extracted, the strata and land surface 
lower. Id. at 474. This lowering can have adverse effects on the structural 
integrity of buildings and houses, as well as the ability to successfully farm 
land, and can cause losses to groundwater and surface ponds. Id. at 474-75. 
Since 1966, Pennsylvania has restricted the amount of coal that can be 
extracted in order to prevent these problems. Id. at 475-76. The Pennsylvania 
Subsidence Act furthered legislation by prohibiting mining that caused damage 
to “public buildings and noncommercial buildings generally used by the 
public, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries.” PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.6 (West 1986). The Court in Keystone held that 
Pennsylvania’s legislature had a legitimate interest in preventing this damage 
and the legislative response was a valid exercise of police power. Keystone, 
480 U.S. at 486, 488. 
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left in the ground, mining companies could not reap the full 
benefits of the land rights they had purchased or leased, and the 
Court found that contract rights were indirectly, but substantially, 
affected.230 The Court upheld the law, however, because it 
addressed and was appropriately tailored to an essential public 
purpose—preventing dangerous subsidence.231 Similarly, although 
the text of Initiative 416 does not specifically mention same-sex 
contracts, the broad language and potential applications of the 
amendment threaten the enforceability of these contracts. 
2. Public Interest 
Initiative 416 is not founded upon the protection of a valid 
public interest, and consideration of whether it is appropriately 
tailored is therefore unnecessary.232 States are entitled to void 
contracts to uphold moral standards, but there is no such standard 
at issue in same-sex relationships.233 Non-marital cohabitation 
                                                          
230 Id. at 504-05. The Court agreed with petitioners’ claim that the statute 
substantially impaired contract rights because it prevented petitioners from 
waiving liability for land surface damage. Id. at 504. The Court also found a 
“significant and legitimate public purpose” in preventing the type of harm 
caused by the mining and extraction of coal. Id. at 505. To balance these 
competing interests, the Court followed its precedent of deferring to legislative 
judgment when the state is not a contracting party. Id. at 505 (citing Energy 
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 
(1983); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)). 
231 Id. at 505. 
232 See supra Parts II.B, III.B (analyzing and rejecting any potentially 
arguable legitimate public interest furthered by Initiative 416 by exploring the 
legitimate intent and history of Initiative 416 and illustrating why the law 
could not pass the rational basis test under Equal Protection jurisprudence). 
233 For example, a court can overturn a contract that is based on a 
promise to breach another contract, because the Contracts Clause would not be 
implicated. See Burgess v. Gateway Communications, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 
888 (S.D.W.V. 1998). Many courts and commentators have rejected the 
contention that homosexuality is “immoral” in any legal context. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2002). The court 
noted that: 
Social tolerance for non-coercive deviant sexual acts, such as 
heterosexual sodomy between spouses and homosexual activity 
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agreements are enforceable in Nebraska.234 The only moral issue 
presented to a Nebraska court enforcing cohabitation agreements 
is that they cannot be based on an exchange of money or lodging 
for sexual intercourse.235 Furthermore, Nebraska does not have a 
public policy against homosexuality in general, as evidenced by 
the fact that sodomy has been decriminalized,236 sexual 
orientation has been rejected as a factor in child custody cases237 
and state non-discrimination laws are applied to harassment 
claims.238 
Although Nebraska’s courts have not addressed same-sex 
relationships or co-habitation agreements, courts in other 
jurisdictions have found them to comply with public policy.239 
                                                          
between consenting adults, has increased to the point where these acts 
have been decriminalized in many nations and in many states of the 
United States. Even where they remain prohibited, efforts at 
enforcement are perfunctory at best. 
Id. The Williams court also noted that the influential Kinsey sex studies 
revealed that “men and women regularly and widely engaged in . . . 
sodomy . . .” and that “[t]he findings of these studies served to demonstrate 
that what was once considered ‘deviant’ is in fact quite normal and common. 
As a result, American attitudes about sexuality changed drastically . . . .” Id. 
234 See Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981). 
235 Id. at 703 (noting that if a contract includes consideration of sexual 
intercourse it is void as against public policy). 
236 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-704 (repealed 1978). 
237 See Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that “sexual activity by a parent, whether it is heterosexual or 
homosexual, is governed by the rule that to establish a material change in 
circumstances justifying a change in custody there must be a showing that the 
minor child or children were exposed to such activity or were adversely 
affected or damaged by reason of such activity”). 
238 See Op. Neb. Att’y Gen. 96044 (1996) (stating that Nebraska’s non-
discrimination law’s “gender-neutral definition demonstrates [that] there is 
nothing . . . to limit . . . sexual harassment to heterosexual harassment” 
because there is the “possibility [of] sexual harassment of men by women, or 
men by other men, or women by other women . . .”). 
239 For example, many states have amended their laws to grant adoption 
and custody rights to gay couples or parents, and numerous judicial decrees 
have granted similar protection and rights to gays and lesbians throughout the 
country. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (holding that 
unmarried, cohabiting couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual, could 
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For example, the California Court of Appeals enforced a 
cohabitation agreement between same-sex partners.240 The court 
stated that “[a]dults who voluntarily live together and engage in 
sexual relations are competent to contract respecting their 
earnings and property rights.”241 There is little support, 
therefore, for the argument that Initiative 416 codifies existing 
public policy against homosexuality or non-marital relations. 
Initiative 416 does not rest upon any public purpose sufficient to 
justify denying recognition of contracts between gay partners. 
                                                          
petition for adoption of a child); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37 
(S.D. 1994) (holding that a custodial parent’s sexual orientation is not a per se 
showing of lack of fitness); see also Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexual 
Couples: A Look at Differing State Court Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1497 
(1998) (discussing adoption rights of homosexual couples in different 
jurisdictions). 
240 See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(reversing the trial court’s conclusion that an oral contract between 
homosexual partners was unenforceable and finding that, over the course of a 
seven year relationship, the plaintiff established “alleged consideration for the 
purported contract substantially independent of sexual services”). But see 
Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d. 1097 (11th Cir. 1997). In Shahar, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit permitted the rescission of an employment 
offer by the Georgia Attorney General based on the applicants lesbian 
“marriage.” Id. at 1099. This decision is significant because it allowed a 
private solemnization of a relationship to dictate a legal outcome, inasmuch as 
the Georgia Attorney General’s disapproval and concerns about the lesbian 
relationship provided legal justification to fire the plaintiff. Id. The Eleventh 
Circuit refused to recognize that intimate associational rights to extend to gay 
relationships. Id. at 1106. The court questioned the plaintiff’s judgment, 
saying that she “seemingly did not appreciate the importance of appearances 
and the need to avoid bringing ‘controversy’ to the Department, the Attorney 
General lost confidence in her ability to make good judgments for the 
Department.” Id. at 1105-06. The court analogized refusing employment to a 
partnered lesbian to refusing employment to a member of the Klu Klux Klan. 
Id. at 1108. 
 The decision raises the possibility that Nebraska courts could find private 
agreements between contracting gay partners unenforceable. Hawaii foresaw 
just this type of interference with private relationships, and specifically 
exempted private solemnization of gay relationships from the purview of its 
laws. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The drafters of Initiative 
416 either did not foresee this potential or chose to ignore it. 
241 See Whorton, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 407. 
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CONCLUSION 
Nebraska voters passed a law that some predict will bring the 
issue of equality for gays before the Supreme Court.242 Indeed, 
the questions presented by Initiative 416 are perhaps even more 
distinct than in Romer v. Evans.243 Romer pitted persons united 
                                                          
242 Immediately after Initiative 416 was passed, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) began preparations to challenge to the amendment. 
See John Barrette, Bush-Gore Battle Not the Only Post Election Court Battle 
in the Works, NEB. STATE PAPER, November 30, 2000; John Fulwider, ACLU 
Hopes to Have 416 in Court by January, NEB. ST. PAPER, November 19, 
2000; John Fulwider, Legal Challenge of 416 in Very Early Stage, NEB. ST. 
PAPER, November 9, 2000. Progress on the lawsuit has moved slowly, 
however, and recent developments in the state have arguably frustrated the 
effort. For example, when the Nebraska Supreme Court barred the adoption of 
a lesbian woman’s child by her female partner in March of 2002, the ACLU 
decided to accept the ruling and abandon any option for appeal. See John 
Fulwider, Lesbian Asks High Court OK to Adopt Partner’s Son, NEB. ST. 
PAPER, October 2, 2001. After the decision, Executive Director of the 
Nebraska ACLU Tim Butz stated that the ruling, “when coupled with 
Initiative 416, just made the family feel like they were not wanted in this state. 
They decided not to fight it, and just move on.” See John Fulwider, ACLU 
Won’t Appeal Gay Adoption Ruling, NEB. ST. PAPER, March 18, 2002. 
Nevertheless, efforts to challenge the Amendment continue through the 
support of the ACLU and social-justice organizations in Nebraska such as 
Citizens for Equal Protection (CFEP) and Parents, Families and Friends of 
Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG). These groups have collaborated with attorneys 
from the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Nebraska as they 
prepare to address the law. Currently, their efforts include attempts to find 
examples of where the law is being applied and how it harms gay couples by 
banning recognition of their relationships. For further information about the 
efforts, see generally PFLAG Lincoln-Cornhusker, at http://pflag.ineb.org 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2003). 
243 517 U.S. 620 (1996). It is interesting to note, however, that during the 
heated litigation of Romer, the plaintiffs sought to strike a sympathetic cord 
with the courts by stressing that the Colorado law was motivated primarily by 
philosophical opposition to homosexuality rather than any legitimate 
government interest. Id. For a thoughtful analysis of the efforts of the Romer 
litigants in the context of the contemporaneous religious conservative 
movement, see Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and the 
Amendment 2 Controversy: The Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination in America, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 261 (2002). According 
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by sexual orientation against all other classes of people, whereas 
Initiative 416 makes a clear distinction between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals, with no basis that one group is more deserving of 
protection than the other. Thus, a court addressing Nebraska’s 
amendment would reach the heart of constitutional issues 
involving gays. Any decision striking down the second sentence 
of this broad law would limit states’ power to regulate gay 
marriage. It would also send a strong message to states that they 
must establish sound bases for legislation that distinguishes 
between homosexuals and heterosexuals. The Nebraska 
Amendment is vulnerable to a legal challenge; litigation would 
ensure that Initiative 416 is subjected to the scrutiny it merits and 
escaped in the popular initiative process.244 
 
                                                          
to Alexander, the Romer plaintiffs provided the texts for all the statutes that 
would be invalidated by the Amendment and the text of communications 
between supporters of the Amendment that displayed a hateful nature and anti-
gay sentiments. Id. at 285. 
 Whether Romer was an unequivocal victory for gay rights advocates, 
however, is a matter of some debate. See Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual 
Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay 
Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 271 (1999) (summarizing Justice Scalia’s 
critique of the majority opinion because it “undermin[ed] democracy when 
homosexuals had the full right to participate in the process”); William C. 
Duncan, The Legacy of Romer v. Evans—So Far, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161 
(2001) (suggesting that the opinion has not had a major impact on the law and 
that early predictions about the achievements of Romer have not been 
vindicated by courts). 
244 As noted, Initiative 416 was passed by popular referendum. See supra 
Part II (discussing the legislative background of Initiative 416 and margin by 
which Nebraska’s voters adopted the amendment). 
